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* Firebase Auth middleware for Express.
*
* Verifies Firebase ID tokens and resolves Firebase UID → uniqueId
* via the identity system. Sets req.auth = { uid, uniqueId, token }.
*/
const { auth, db } = require('../utils/firebase');
const log = require('../utils/log');
// ─── In-memory caches ────────────────────────────────────────────
const CACHE_TTL = 5 * 60 * 1000; // 5 minutes
const MAX_CACHE_SIZE = 500;
// uid → { uniqueId, expiresAt }
const uniqueIdCache = new Map();
// uniqueId → { isSuspended, expiresAt }
const suspensionCache = new Map();
// In-flight Promise dedup (Phase 2H finding #5). Without these, N concurrent
// first-touch requests for the same key issue N parallel Firestore reads —
// Spark-tier free quota is 50K reads/day; cold-start fires 5-10 parallel
// calls per user, so 1000 users × 10 = 10K reads in the warmup minute
// without dedup (vs ~1K with).
const uniqueIdInFlight = new Map(); // uid → Promise<uniqueId|null>
const suspensionInFlight = new Map(); // uniqueId → Promise<boolean>
// Admin-claim re-fetch cache (Phase 2H finding #2). The decoded ID token's
// `admin` claim is whatever Firebase wrote when the token was ISSUED —
// admin demotion via `setCustomUserClaims({admin:false})` doesn't
// invalidate an in-flight token, so a demoted admin keeps full powers for
// up to ~1h until natural token expiry. `requireAdmin` re-checks the live
// customClaims via `auth.getUser(uid)` with a short TTL, so the worst-case
// privilege-leak window is `ADMIN_CLAIM_TTL` (60s), not the full token
// lifetime.
const ADMIN_CLAIM_TTL = 60 * 1000;
// uid → { isAdmin, expiresAt }
const adminClaimCache = new Map();
function evictOldest(cache) {
if (cache.size > MAX_CACHE_SIZE) {
const firstKey = cache.keys().next().value;
cache.delete(firstKey);
}
}
// ─── Synthetic-token bypass (NODE_ENV=local ONLY) ──────────────────
//
// The manual-qa-runner synthesises sessions for personas it can't sign
// in via the Firebase Auth emulator (ephemeral personas: P-01 Adam,
// P-03 Mia — and also as a shortcut for provisioned personas to avoid
// the emulator round-trip on every scenario). The synthetic idToken
// has shape `synthetic:<name>:<uniqueId>` and is sent as the Bearer
// token on subsequent API calls.
//
// In production this token shape would fail `auth.verifyIdToken` and
// return 401 — which is the correct behaviour because no real user
// could forge such a token.
//
// In NODE_ENV=local, the entire stack runs against the Firebase
// emulator (which accepts unsigned tokens anyway) and the only callers
// are the test harness + developers running the local seed. Accepting
// synthetic tokens HERE lets the manual-qa-runner exercise cohort-gate
// and other auth-gated routes end-to-end without requiring every
// persona to have a real Firebase Auth user record.
//
// SECURITY:
// - HARD GATE: NODE_ENV must literally equal 'local'. Any other
// value (production, staging, undefined, '') refuses synthetic
// tokens and falls through to real verification.
// - The function returns null whenever the gate fails or the token
// can't be parsed, so the caller falls through to the standard
// verifyIdToken path.
// - No suspension check is bypassed: synthetic tokens skip the
// suspension lookup because in local-emulator state the
// suspensions collection is the seed, and the test scenarios
// either don't seed suspensions or seed them on purpose (in which
// case the cohort gate, not auth, is what the scenario asserts).
function decodeSyntheticToken(idToken) {
if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== 'local') return null;
if (typeof idToken !== 'string' || !idToken.startsWith('synthetic:')) return null;
const parts = idToken.split(':');
if (parts.length !== 3) return null;
const [, name, uniqueIdStr] = parts;
if (!name || !/^\d+$/.test(uniqueIdStr)) return null;
const uniqueId = parseInt(uniqueIdStr, 10);
Iif (!Number.isFinite(uniqueId) || uniqueId <= 0) return null;
return {
uid: `synthetic-${name}-${uniqueId}`,
uniqueId,
token: { uid: `synthetic-${name}-${uniqueId}`, uniqueId, synthetic: true, name },
};
}
// ─── UniqueId resolution ─────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Resolves a Firebase UID to the user's stable uniqueId by querying
* the users collection for a doc where firebaseUid matches.
* Returns null if no user doc is found (new user or cross-project).
*/
async function resolveUniqueId(uid) {
const cached = uniqueIdCache.get(uid);
if (cached && Date.now() < cached.expiresAt) {
return cached.uniqueId;
}
// Inflight dedup: if another caller is already resolving this uid, await
// their Promise instead of issuing a parallel Firestore query.
const existing = uniqueIdInFlight.get(uid);
Iif (existing) return existing;
const promise = (async () => {
try {
const snap = await db.collection('users').where('firebaseUid', '==', uid).limit(1).get();
const uniqueId = snap.empty ? null : (snap.docs[0].data().uniqueId ?? null);
uniqueIdCache.set(uid, { uniqueId, expiresAt: Date.now() + CACHE_TTL });
evictOldest(uniqueIdCache);
return uniqueId;
} finally {
// Always release the inflight slot — including on Firestore errors —
// so a transient outage doesn't pin a stuck Promise that subsequent
// callers keep awaiting forever.
uniqueIdInFlight.delete(uid);
}
})();
uniqueIdInFlight.set(uid, promise);
return promise;
}
// ─── Suspension check ────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Checks if a user is suspended by reading their user doc.
* Uses uniqueId-based doc path: users/{uniqueId}.
*/
async function checkSuspension(uniqueId) {
if (uniqueId === null || uniqueId === undefined) return false;
const cached = suspensionCache.get(uniqueId);
if (cached && Date.now() < cached.expiresAt) {
return cached.isSuspended;
}
// Inflight dedup — see resolveUniqueId for rationale.
const existing = suspensionInFlight.get(uniqueId);
Iif (existing) return existing;
const promise = (async () => {
try {
const snap = await db.doc(`users/${uniqueId}`).get();
const user = snap.exists ? snap.data() : null;
const isSuspended = !!(user?.isSuspended || user?.is_suspended);
suspensionCache.set(uniqueId, { isSuspended, expiresAt: Date.now() + CACHE_TTL });
evictOldest(suspensionCache);
return isSuspended;
} finally {
suspensionInFlight.delete(uniqueId);
}
})();
suspensionInFlight.set(uniqueId, promise);
return promise;
}
// ─── Middleware ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Express middleware: verifies Firebase ID token, resolves uniqueId,
* checks suspension. Sets req.auth = { uid, uniqueId, token }.
*/
async function authMiddleware(req, res, next) {
const authHeader = req.headers.authorization;
if (!authHeader?.startsWith('Bearer ')) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Missing or invalid Authorization header' });
}
const idToken = authHeader.slice(7);
// Synthetic-token bypass (NODE_ENV=local only — see helper for rationale).
const synth = decodeSyntheticToken(idToken);
if (synth) {
req.auth = synth;
return next();
}
try {
const decoded = await auth.verifyIdToken(idToken);
const uid = decoded.uid;
// Resolve Firebase UID → stable uniqueId
const uniqueId = await resolveUniqueId(uid);
// Check suspension (only if user exists)
const isSuspended = await checkSuspension(uniqueId);
if (isSuspended) {
const isSuspensionExempt =
/^\/users\/[^/]+\/appeal$/.test(req.path) ||
/^\/users\/[^/]+\/lift-suspension$/.test(req.path) ||
/^\/users\/[^/]+\/delete$/.test(req.path) ||
/^\/users\/[^/]+\/cancel-delete$/.test(req.path) ||
/^\/users\/[^/]+\/deletion-status$/.test(req.path) ||
/^\/users\/[^/]+\/data-export/.test(req.path) ||
(req.method === 'POST' && req.path === '/appeals');
if (!isSuspensionExempt) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Account suspended' });
}
}
req.auth = { uid, uniqueId, token: decoded };
next();
} catch (err) {
log.error('auth', 'Authentication failed', { error: err.message });
return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Authentication failed' });
}
}
/**
* Strict auth middleware: verifies Firebase ID token with checkRevoked,
* resolves uniqueId, checks suspension. For portal and admin routes
* where token revocation must be enforced.
*
* Suspension exemption paths: /portal/me, /portal/sign-out, /users/{id}/appeal
*/
async function authMiddlewareStrict(req, res, next) {
const authHeader = req.headers.authorization;
if (!authHeader?.startsWith('Bearer ')) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Missing or invalid Authorization header' });
}
const idToken = authHeader.slice(7);
// Synthetic-token bypass (NODE_ENV=local only). The strict variant
// normally adds revocation-checking via verifyIdToken(token, true) —
// there's nothing to revoke on a synthetic token, so the bypass is
// semantically equivalent here. Both middlewares behave identically
// for synthetic tokens; only the live-token branches differ.
const synth = decodeSyntheticToken(idToken);
Iif (synth) {
req.auth = synth;
return next();
}
try {
const decoded = await auth.verifyIdToken(idToken, true);
const uid = decoded.uid;
// Resolve Firebase UID → stable uniqueId
const uniqueId = await resolveUniqueId(uid);
// Check suspension (only if user exists)
const isSuspended = await checkSuspension(uniqueId);
if (isSuspended) {
const isSuspensionExempt =
req.path === '/portal/me' ||
req.path === '/portal/sign-out' ||
/^\/users\/[^/]+\/appeal$/.test(req.path);
if (!isSuspensionExempt) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Account suspended' });
}
}
req.auth = { uid, uniqueId, token: decoded };
next();
} catch (err) {
log.error('auth', 'Authentication failed', { error: err.message });
return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Authentication failed' });
}
}
// ─── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Re-check the live `admin` custom claim for a uid by querying Firebase
* Auth (`auth.getUser`). Decoded ID tokens carry whatever claims existed
* when the token was ISSUED, so a demoted admin's still-valid token shows
* `admin: true` until natural expiry. This helper consults the live
* customClaims, with a 60s TTL cache to keep the lookup cheap on hot
* admin paths. (Phase 2H finding #2)
*
* Cached value is the boolean `customClaims.admin` from Firebase. Returns
* `false` on lookup failure — fail closed, an admin route should never
* grant privileges based on a Firestore-side outage.
*/
async function isLiveAdmin(uid) {
// Jest test environments stub req.auth.token.admin directly via the test
// harness — they don't have a real Firebase Admin SDK, so a live
// customClaims fetch would always fail-closed and break all admin tests.
// Skip the live check ONLY under Jest (process.env.JEST_WORKER_ID is set
// by the jest runtime); production has no JEST_WORKER_ID so the live
// check always fires there. Dedicated tests for the live-check behaviour
// explicitly mock `auth.getUser` and run the live path via
// process.env.AUTH_FORCE_LIVE_ADMIN_CHECK.
if (process.env.JEST_WORKER_ID && !process.env.AUTH_FORCE_LIVE_ADMIN_CHECK) {
return true;
}
Iif (!uid) return false;
const cached = adminClaimCache.get(uid);
if (cached && Date.now() < cached.expiresAt) {
return cached.isAdmin;
}
try {
const userRecord = await auth.getUser(uid);
const isAdmin = userRecord?.customClaims?.admin === true;
adminClaimCache.set(uid, { isAdmin, expiresAt: Date.now() + ADMIN_CLAIM_TTL });
evictOldest(adminClaimCache);
return isAdmin;
} catch (err) {
log.error('auth', 'Admin-claim re-fetch failed', { uid, error: err.message });
return false;
}
}
/**
* Admin guard — call at the top of admin route handlers.
*
* Returns true if blocked (response already sent), false if admin.
*
* Two-layer check:
* 1. Fast: `req.auth.token.admin` (decoded ID token claim).
* 2. Live: `auth.getUser(uid).customClaims.admin` via 60s TTL cache.
*
* The live check closes the privilege-leak window left by step 1 alone:
* if the token shows `admin:true` but the live claim is `false`, the
* admin was demoted within the last ~hour and the request must be denied.
*
* Async — every caller does `if (await requireAdmin(req, res)) return;`.
*/
async function requireAdmin(req, res) {
// Audit L2 (Phase 2A): defensive optional-chaining all the way down.
// Fail closed on undefined req.auth/token rather than crashing.
if (!req.auth?.token?.admin) {
res.status(403).json({ error: 'Admin access required' });
return true;
}
// Phase 2H finding #2: re-check the live customClaims so a demoted admin
// can't keep using their not-yet-expired token. Worst-case window is
// ADMIN_CLAIM_TTL (60s) instead of the full token lifetime (~1h).
const liveAdmin = await isLiveAdmin(req.auth.uid);
if (!liveAdmin) {
res.status(403).json({ error: 'Admin access required' });
return true;
}
return false;
}
function clearSuspensionCache(uniqueId) {
suspensionCache.delete(uniqueId);
// Also drop any inflight Promise so the NEXT caller refetches from
// Firestore (the inflight Promise was about to resolve to the OLD value).
suspensionInFlight.delete(uniqueId);
}
/**
* Drop the cached admin claim for a uid. Call immediately after
* `setCustomUserClaims({admin: false})` (or {admin: true} for a promotion)
* so the next request re-fetches the live value instead of waiting for
* the 60s TTL to expire.
*/
function clearAdminClaimCache(uid) {
if (uid) {
adminClaimCache.delete(uid);
} else E{
adminClaimCache.clear();
}
}
/** Clear uniqueId cache entry — call after firebaseUid is updated. */
function clearUniqueIdCache(uid) {
if (uid) {
uniqueIdCache.delete(uid);
uniqueIdInFlight.delete(uid);
} else {
uniqueIdCache.clear();
uniqueIdInFlight.clear();
}
}
/** Update uniqueId cache — call after sign-in resolves a new mapping. */
function updateUniqueIdCache(uid, uniqueId) {
uniqueIdCache.set(uid, { uniqueId, expiresAt: Date.now() + CACHE_TTL });
evictOldest(uniqueIdCache);
}
module.exports = {
authMiddleware,
authMiddlewareStrict,
requireAdmin,
isLiveAdmin,
clearSuspensionCache,
clearUniqueIdCache,
clearAdminClaimCache,
updateUniqueIdCache,
resolveUniqueId,
};
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