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* Firebase Auth middleware for Express.
*
* Verifies Firebase ID tokens and resolves Firebase UID → uniqueId
* via the identity system. Sets req.auth = { uid, uniqueId, token }.
*/
const { auth, db } = require('../utils/firebase');
const { checkUserBans, clearBanCache } = require('../utils/bans');
const { syncBannedClaim } = require('../utils/banned-claim');
const log = require('../utils/log');
// ─── In-memory caches ────────────────────────────────────────────
const CACHE_TTL = 5 * 60 * 1000; // 5 minutes
const MAX_CACHE_SIZE = 500;
// uid → { uniqueId, expiresAt }
const uniqueIdCache = new Map();
// uniqueId → { isSuspended, expiresAt }
const suspensionCache = new Map();
// In-flight Promise dedup (Phase 2H finding #5). Without these, N concurrent
// first-touch requests for the same key issue N parallel Firestore reads —
// Spark-tier free quota is 50K reads/day; cold-start fires 5-10 parallel
// calls per user, so 1000 users × 10 = 10K reads in the warmup minute
// without dedup (vs ~1K with).
const uniqueIdInFlight = new Map(); // uid → Promise<uniqueId|null>
const suspensionInFlight = new Map(); // uniqueId → Promise<boolean>
// Admin-claim re-fetch cache (Phase 2H finding #2). The decoded ID token's
// `admin` claim is whatever Firebase wrote when the token was ISSUED —
// admin demotion via `setCustomUserClaims({admin:false})` doesn't
// invalidate an in-flight token, so a demoted admin keeps full powers for
// up to ~1h until natural token expiry. `requireAdmin` re-checks the live
// customClaims via `auth.getUser(uid)` with a short TTL, so the worst-case
// privilege-leak window is `ADMIN_CLAIM_TTL` (60s), not the full token
// lifetime.
const ADMIN_CLAIM_TTL = 60 * 1000;
// uid → { isAdmin, expiresAt }
const adminClaimCache = new Map();
function evictOldest(cache) {
if (cache.size > MAX_CACHE_SIZE) {
const firstKey = cache.keys().next().value;
cache.delete(firstKey);
}
}
// ─── Synthetic-token bypass (NODE_ENV=local ONLY) ──────────────────
//
// The manual-qa-runner synthesises sessions for personas it can't sign
// in via the Firebase Auth emulator (ephemeral personas: P-01 Adam,
// P-03 Mia — and also as a shortcut for provisioned personas to avoid
// the emulator round-trip on every scenario). The synthetic idToken
// has shape `synthetic:<name>:<uniqueId>` and is sent as the Bearer
// token on subsequent API calls.
//
// In production this token shape would fail `auth.verifyIdToken` and
// return 401 — which is the correct behaviour because no real user
// could forge such a token.
//
// In NODE_ENV=local, the entire stack runs against the Firebase
// emulator (which accepts unsigned tokens anyway) and the only callers
// are the test harness + developers running the local seed. Accepting
// synthetic tokens HERE lets the manual-qa-runner exercise cohort-gate
// and other auth-gated routes end-to-end without requiring every
// persona to have a real Firebase Auth user record.
//
// SECURITY:
// - HARD GATE: NODE_ENV must literally equal 'local'. Any other
// value (production, staging, undefined, '') refuses synthetic
// tokens and falls through to real verification.
// - The function returns null whenever the gate fails or the token
// can't be parsed, so the caller falls through to the standard
// verifyIdToken path.
// - No suspension check is bypassed: synthetic tokens skip the
// suspension lookup because in local-emulator state the
// suspensions collection is the seed, and the test scenarios
// either don't seed suspensions or seed them on purpose (in which
// case the cohort gate, not auth, is what the scenario asserts).
function decodeSyntheticToken(idToken) {
if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== 'local') return null;
if (typeof idToken !== 'string' || !idToken.startsWith('synthetic:')) return null;
const parts = idToken.split(':');
if (parts.length !== 3) return null;
const [, name, uniqueIdStr] = parts;
if (!name || !/^\d+$/.test(uniqueIdStr)) return null;
const uniqueId = parseInt(uniqueIdStr, 10);
Iif (!Number.isFinite(uniqueId) || uniqueId <= 0) return null;
return {
uid: `synthetic-${name}-${uniqueId}`,
uniqueId,
token: { uid: `synthetic-${name}-${uniqueId}`, uniqueId, synthetic: true, name },
};
}
// ─── UniqueId resolution ─────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Resolves a Firebase UID to the user's stable uniqueId by querying
* the users collection for a doc where firebaseUid matches.
* Returns null if no user doc is found (new user or cross-project).
*/
async function resolveUniqueId(uid) {
const cached = uniqueIdCache.get(uid);
if (cached && Date.now() < cached.expiresAt) {
return cached.uniqueId;
}
// Inflight dedup: if another caller is already resolving this uid, await
// their Promise instead of issuing a parallel Firestore query.
const existing = uniqueIdInFlight.get(uid);
if (existing) return existing;
const promise = (async () => {
try {
const snap = await db.collection('users').where('firebaseUid', '==', uid).limit(1).get();
const uniqueId = snap.empty ? null : (snap.docs[0].data().uniqueId ?? null);
uniqueIdCache.set(uid, { uniqueId, expiresAt: Date.now() + CACHE_TTL });
evictOldest(uniqueIdCache);
return uniqueId;
} finally {
// Always release the inflight slot — including on Firestore errors —
// so a transient outage doesn't pin a stuck Promise that subsequent
// callers keep awaiting forever.
uniqueIdInFlight.delete(uid);
}
})();
uniqueIdInFlight.set(uid, promise);
return promise;
}
// ─── Suspension check ────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Checks if a user is suspended by reading their user doc.
* Uses uniqueId-based doc path: users/{uniqueId}.
*/
async function checkSuspension(uniqueId) {
if (uniqueId === null || uniqueId === undefined) return false;
const cached = suspensionCache.get(uniqueId);
if (cached && Date.now() < cached.expiresAt) {
return cached.isSuspended;
}
// Inflight dedup — see resolveUniqueId for rationale.
const existing = suspensionInFlight.get(uniqueId);
if (existing) return existing;
const promise = (async () => {
try {
const snap = await db.doc(`users/${uniqueId}`).get();
const user = snap.exists ? snap.data() : null;
const isSuspended = !!(user?.isSuspended || user?.is_suspended);
suspensionCache.set(uniqueId, { isSuspended, expiresAt: Date.now() + CACHE_TTL });
evictOldest(suspensionCache);
return isSuspended;
} finally {
suspensionInFlight.delete(uniqueId);
}
})();
suspensionInFlight.set(uniqueId, promise);
return promise;
}
// ─── Middleware ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Express middleware: verifies Firebase ID token, resolves uniqueId,
* checks suspension. Sets req.auth = { uid, uniqueId, token }.
*/
/**
* Verify the caller's credential, or answer 401 `token_rejected` and return
* null. Both middlewares share this so they cannot drift apart -- they
* previously held byte-identical blocks, which is exactly how one of them gets
* a fix the other does not (SHY-0308).
*
* Returns the decoded token, or null when it has ALREADY answered the request.
* Callers must `return` on null; they must not fall through.
*
* @param {boolean} checkRevoked - strict routes pass true, so a revoked session
* is refused here as the rejected credential it is.
*/
async function verifyCredentialOrReject(res, idToken, checkRevoked) {
try {
return await auth.verifyIdToken(idToken, checkRevoked);
} catch (err) {
log.error('auth', 'Authentication failed: token rejected', {
error: err.message,
firebaseCode: err.code,
});
res.status(401).json({ error: 'Authentication failed', code: 'token_rejected' });
return null;
}
}
/**
* Refuse a request whose credential was ACCEPTED but whose standing could not
* be established -- identity resolution, the suspension check, or the ban
* lookup failing. Refusing is correct (a control that fails open is not a
* control); the caller's credential was simply never the problem, and saying
* so is the difference this story exists for.
*/
function rejectStandingUnavailable(req, res, err) {
log.error('auth', 'Authentication failed: standing lookup failed', {
error: err.message,
path: req.path,
});
return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Authentication failed', code: 'standing_unavailable' });
}
async function authMiddleware(req, res, next) {
const authHeader = req.headers.authorization;
if (!authHeader?.startsWith('Bearer ')) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Missing or invalid Authorization header' });
}
const idToken = authHeader.slice(7);
// Synthetic-token bypass (NODE_ENV=local only — see helper for rationale).
const synth = decodeSyntheticToken(idToken);
if (synth) {
req.auth = synth;
return next();
}
// SHY-0308: the credential check is deliberately OUTSIDE the block below.
// A rejected token and a standing lookup that could not complete are
// different failures that happened to share one catch, one status and one
// string -- so a refusal could not be attributed to either. It cost a dig
// through a Playwright trace to learn that a suite failure reading
// "Expected 403, Received 401" had never reached the ban gate at all.
const decoded = await verifyCredentialOrReject(res, idToken, false);
if (!decoded) return undefined; // verifyCredentialOrReject already answered.
try {
const uid = decoded.uid;
// Resolve Firebase UID → stable uniqueId
const uniqueId = await resolveUniqueId(uid);
// Check suspension (only if user exists)
const isSuspended = await checkSuspension(uniqueId);
if (isSuspended && !isSuspensionExemptPath(req)) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Account suspended' });
}
// Per-request ban gate (SHY-0149): device + network bans, matched on
// the REAL edge IP. Runs on every auth-gated request so the web,
// direct-API, modified-client, and mid-session bypasses are all closed.
//
// The exemption is tested BEFORE the lookup, never after. An exempt path
// is reachable by a banned user by definition, so its verdict is already
// known — and a lookup FAILURE (fail-closed, rejects into the catch → 401)
// must not confiscate the appeal / GDPR-export / ban-screen rights a ban
// itself spares. Ordering this the other way locked those paths out of a
// permanently-truncating account for good (reviewer C-NEW-1).
if (!isBanExemptPath(req)) {
const ban = await checkUserBans(uniqueId, req.ip);
// SHY-0150 lazy claim sync: the fresh verdict and the decoded token
// meet exactly here — when they disagree, reconcile the `banned`
// custom claim so the Firestore rules gate tracks standings no route
// ever mutated (lazy expiry, binding flips, UNLINKED network bans
// caught by the live IP). Mint rides the verdict; clear goes through
// the full recompute inside syncBannedClaim (never the IP-scoped
// verdict). syncBannedClaim never throws — a sync failure must not
// turn this request into the outer catch's 401.
const tokenBanned = decoded.banned === true;
if (ban.isBanned) {
if (!tokenBanned) {
await syncBannedClaim(uniqueId, { uid, verdictBanned: true, dedupe: true });
}
log.warn('auth', 'Request denied: banned', {
path: req.path,
uniqueId,
banType: ban.banType,
});
return res.status(403).json({
error: 'Account banned',
code: 'banned',
banType: ban.banType,
reason: ban.reason,
expiresAt: ban.expiresAt,
});
}
if (tokenBanned) {
await syncBannedClaim(uniqueId, { uid, dedupe: true });
}
}
if (!hasResolvedIdentity(uniqueId) && !allowsMissingIdentity(req)) {
req.__authUid = uid;
return rejectMissingIdentity(req, res);
}
req.auth = { uid, uniqueId, token: decoded };
next();
} catch (err) {
return rejectStandingUnavailable(req, res, err);
}
}
/**
* Routes that legitimately run before a `uniqueId` exists (SHY-0426).
*
* Everything else is refused when the account cannot be identified. This is
* the whole allowlist, kept short deliberately so it can be read and argued
* with — the alternative was a guard in each of 30 route files, which is 30
* chances to miss one and 30 more for every route added afterwards.
*
* Matched on METHOD and EXACT path: `GET /users` is a listing and has no
* business running without an identity, and `/users/50000010/appeal` must not
* inherit `/users`'s exemption by prefix.
*/
const PRE_IDENTITY_ROUTES = [
// Creates the account. There is no identity yet, by definition.
//
// NOT `standingExempt`: creating an account is an ACTION, not a verdict.
// With no identity to resolve, the standing gates match this caller by
// device and IP — which is exactly how a banned person is stopped from
// opening a fresh account on the banned handset. Exempting it would
// legalise ban evasion at the one route that performs it (SHY-0461).
{ method: 'POST', path: '/users', standingExempt: false },
// May be what creates the document for a Firebase account that authenticated
// first. It is also the FIRST call the app makes, and it already answers
// `{ found, suspended }` without mutating — see `POST /users/sign-in`.
{ method: 'POST', path: '/users/sign-in', standingExempt: true },
// Device binding, which runs in the SIGN-IN flow before any account exists —
// it is how the app learns whether this handset is already locked to
// somebody.
{ method: 'POST', path: '/devices/lock-check', standingExempt: true },
// How the app LEARNS it is banned. Gating it would replace the ban screen
// with a generic error while enforcing nothing; it is a verdict channel, not
// an abuse-capable action.
{ method: 'POST', path: '/device-info', standingExempt: true },
{ method: 'GET', path: '/device-info', standingExempt: true },
];
/**
* Is this a real account identifier, or the absence of one?
*
* PRESENCE, deliberately — not `Number.isInteger`. The defect is that `null`
* collapses every unidentified caller into one "account" because
* `null === null`. That is what this refuses. Insisting on an integer would
* ALSO change an unrelated contract: the codebase is inconsistent about
* whether a uniqueId is a number or a string (the seeded personas use numbers,
* several suites use strings), so a type gate here would lock out real callers
* for a reason nobody asked about.
*/
function hasResolvedIdentity(uniqueId) {
if (uniqueId === null || uniqueId === undefined) return false;
if (typeof uniqueId === 'string') return uniqueId.trim() !== '';
return typeof uniqueId === 'number' ? Number.isFinite(uniqueId) : Boolean(uniqueId);
}
/** Fails CLOSED: an unrecognised request shape is not a way through. */
function allowsMissingIdentity(req) {
const method = req?.method;
const path = req?.path;
if (typeof method !== 'string' || typeof path !== 'string') return false;
return PRE_IDENTITY_ROUTES.some((r) => r.method === method && r.path === path);
}
/**
* A route whose job is to TELL the caller what its standing is must not be
* gated on that standing (SHY-0461).
*
* The gate was circular. `POST /users/sign-in` is the FIRST call the app
* makes, and both standing gates refused it — so a suspended person could
* not resolve their identity, therefore never reached the user document they
* are in fact allowed to read, never reached the ban check, and was shown
* "cannot connect" with no reason and no appeal. A banned person hit the same
* wall, which put the ban screen out of reach on a cold sign-in too. Verified
* on the OnePlus; J11 pins it.
*
* Read off `PRE_IDENTITY_ROUTES` rather than a second hand-written list, so
* the two cannot drift and adding a pre-identity route forces one explicit
* decision — `standingExempt` — instead of silently inheriting either answer.
*
* Being pre-identity is NOT sufficient on its own: `POST /users` is in that
* table and is deliberately `standingExempt: false`, because it acts rather
* than reports and exempting it would legalise ban evasion.
*
* Matched on METHOD and EXACT path, exactly as `allowsMissingIdentity` is.
*/
function isStandingVerdictChannel(req) {
const method = req?.method;
const path = req?.path;
Iif (typeof method !== 'string' || typeof path !== 'string') return false;
return PRE_IDENTITY_ROUTES.some(
(r) => r.standingExempt && r.method === method && r.path === path,
);
}
/**
* Refuse a caller whose account could not be identified.
*
* A distinct code, not a generic 401: the credential was fine, and the client
* needs to tell "sign in again" from "your account is in a state we cannot
* resolve" — the second is a bug report, not a retry.
*
* Shared by both middlewares rather than written twice; byte-identical blocks
* in this file are exactly how one of them gets a fix the other does not
* (SHY-0308).
*/
function rejectMissingIdentity(req, res) {
log.warn('auth', 'Refused a caller with no resolved identity', {
uid: req.auth?.uid || req.__authUid,
method: req.method,
path: req.path,
});
res.status(403).json({ error: 'Your account could not be identified', code: 'no_identity' });
}
/**
* Paths a SUSPENDED user may still reach: the appeal flow plus the
* account-deletion / GDPR-export rights that suspension must not remove.
*/
function isSuspensionExemptPath(req) {
return (
// The standing-verdict channels. Without these a suspended person cannot
// discover that they are suspended, which is the whole of SHY-0461.
isStandingVerdictChannel(req) ||
/^\/users\/[^/]+\/appeal$/.test(req.path) ||
/^\/users\/[^/]+\/lift-suspension$/.test(req.path) ||
/^\/users\/[^/]+\/delete$/.test(req.path) ||
/^\/users\/[^/]+\/cancel-delete$/.test(req.path) ||
/^\/users\/[^/]+\/deletion-status$/.test(req.path) ||
/^\/users\/[^/]+\/data-export/.test(req.path) ||
(req.method === 'POST' && req.path === '/appeals') ||
// Portal self-service. portal.js mounts `authMiddlewareStrict` per-route,
// and that middleware carves these two out — but EVERY /api request runs
// through THIS middleware first (index.js mounts it globally), so without
// the same carve-out here the strict exemption was unreachable: a
// suspended user could not view their own portal profile or even sign
// out. Pre-existing for suspension; the ban gate would have inherited it
// (reviewer R3-C2).
req.path === '/portal/me' ||
req.path === '/portal/sign-out'
);
}
/**
* Paths a BANNED user may still reach: everything a suspended user may
* (appeals + GDPR rights survive a ban), PLUS the two ban-delivery /
* device-binding channels — /device-info is how the app LEARNS it is
* banned (the ban screen), and /devices/lock-check runs pre-ban-screen in
* the sign-in flow. Gating those would replace the ban screen with a
* generic error while enforcing nothing (both are telemetry/verdict
* endpoints, not abuse-capable actions).
*
* ONE deliberate subtraction: `/portal/me`. A SUSPENDED user reaches it and
* portal.js answers with an explicit `isSuspended` payload — but portal.js
* has no ban branch at all, so exempting a BANNED user would hand them a
* normal-looking dashboard with no hint they are banned. The gate's own 403
* (`code: 'banned'` + reason + expiresAt) IS the ban notice, and it is the
* same shape every other client already renders. Signing out, by contrast,
* must always work — a ban is not a reason to trap someone in a session.
*/
function isBanExemptPath(req) {
if (req.path === '/portal/me') return false;
// `/device-info` and `/devices/lock-check` used to be named again here.
// They are standing-verdict channels, so `isSuspensionExemptPath` now
// derives them from `PRE_IDENTITY_ROUTES` and this list would have been a
// second place for the same fact to be stated — and eventually disagreed
// with. The derived form is also method-exact, where the old string compare
// matched any verb on those paths.
return isSuspensionExemptPath(req);
}
/**
* Strict auth middleware: verifies Firebase ID token with checkRevoked,
* resolves uniqueId, checks suspension. For portal and admin routes
* where token revocation must be enforced.
*
* Suspension exemption paths: /portal/me, /portal/sign-out, /users/{id}/appeal
*/
async function authMiddlewareStrict(req, res, next) {
const authHeader = req.headers.authorization;
if (!authHeader?.startsWith('Bearer ')) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Missing or invalid Authorization header' });
}
const idToken = authHeader.slice(7);
// Synthetic-token bypass (NODE_ENV=local only). The strict variant
// normally adds revocation-checking via verifyIdToken(token, true) —
// there's nothing to revoke on a synthetic token, so the bypass is
// semantically equivalent here. Both middlewares behave identically
// for synthetic tokens; only the live-token branches differ.
const synth = decodeSyntheticToken(idToken);
Iif (synth) {
req.auth = synth;
return next();
}
// SHY-0308: the credential check is deliberately OUTSIDE the block below.
// A rejected token and a standing lookup that could not complete are
// different failures that happened to share one catch, one status and one
// string -- so a refusal could not be attributed to either. It cost a dig
// through a Playwright trace to learn that a suite failure reading
// "Expected 403, Received 401" had never reached the ban gate at all.
// `true` = check revocation, so `auth/id-token-revoked` lands here too: a
// revoked session IS a rejected credential.
const decoded = await verifyCredentialOrReject(res, idToken, true);
if (!decoded) return undefined; // verifyCredentialOrReject already answered.
try {
const uid = decoded.uid;
// Resolve Firebase UID → stable uniqueId
const uniqueId = await resolveUniqueId(uid);
// Check suspension (only if user exists)
const isSuspended = await checkSuspension(uniqueId);
const isStrictSuspensionExempt =
// Same rule as the outer gate. No standing-verdict channel is mounted
// under STRICT today (it guards /portal/* and admin), so this term
// changes nothing now — it is here because the two gates diverging is
// the failure this file has already been bitten by (reviewer R5-C1),
// and one rule stated once cannot diverge from itself.
isStandingVerdictChannel(req) ||
req.path === '/portal/me' ||
req.path === '/portal/sign-out' ||
/^\/users\/[^/]+\/appeal$/.test(req.path);
if (isSuspended && !isStrictSuspensionExempt) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Account suspended' });
}
// A BAN exempts strictly less than a suspension does. `/portal/me` is
// reachable while suspended (portal.js answers with an `isSuspended`
// payload) but NOT while banned — portal.js has no ban branch, so a banned
// caller would receive a normal-looking dashboard. This is the same
// subtraction `isBanExemptPath` makes for the outer gate. The two lists
// must agree: today the outer gate reaches every /portal/* request first
// and masks a divergence here (reviewer R5-C1).
const isStrictBanExempt = isStrictSuspensionExempt && req.path !== '/portal/me';
// Per-request ban gate (SHY-0149). Exemption is checked BEFORE the lookup
// so a fail-closed rejection cannot strip those rights (reviewer C-NEW-1).
if (!isStrictBanExempt) {
const ban = await checkUserBans(uniqueId, req.ip);
// SHY-0150 lazy claim sync — same reconciliation as authMiddleware
// (see the comment there); the two gates must not diverge.
const tokenBanned = decoded.banned === true;
if (ban.isBanned) {
Eif (!tokenBanned) {
await syncBannedClaim(uniqueId, { uid, verdictBanned: true, dedupe: true });
}
log.warn('auth', 'Request denied: banned (strict)', {
path: req.path,
uniqueId,
banType: ban.banType,
});
return res.status(403).json({
error: 'Account banned',
code: 'banned',
banType: ban.banType,
reason: ban.reason,
expiresAt: ban.expiresAt,
});
}
Iif (tokenBanned) {
await syncBannedClaim(uniqueId, { uid, dedupe: true });
}
}
Iif (!hasResolvedIdentity(uniqueId) && !allowsMissingIdentity(req)) {
req.__authUid = uid;
return rejectMissingIdentity(req, res);
}
req.auth = { uid, uniqueId, token: decoded };
next();
} catch (err) {
return rejectStandingUnavailable(req, res, err);
}
}
// ─── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Re-check the live `admin` custom claim for a uid by querying Firebase
* Auth (`auth.getUser`). Decoded ID tokens carry whatever claims existed
* when the token was ISSUED, so a demoted admin's still-valid token shows
* `admin: true` until natural expiry. This helper consults the live
* customClaims, with a 60s TTL cache to keep the lookup cheap on hot
* admin paths. (Phase 2H finding #2)
*
* Cached value is the boolean `customClaims.admin` from Firebase. Returns
* `false` on lookup failure — fail closed, an admin route should never
* grant privileges based on a Firestore-side outage.
*/
async function isLiveAdmin(uid) {
// Skip the live check under Jest UNLESS AUTH_FORCE_LIVE_ADMIN_CHECK is set.
// Most admin tests assert behaviour OTHER than the live re-check and would
// otherwise need to seed live customClaims for every admin caller; skipping
// (return true) lets them pass on the token claim alone. Production has no
// JEST_WORKER_ID, so the live check ALWAYS fires there. Tests that DO exercise
// the live path set AUTH_FORCE_LIVE_ADMIN_CHECK and establish the live claim
// for REAL via auth.setCustomUserClaims against the Auth emulator — no mock of
// auth.getUser is involved (EPIC-0003 real-only; see livekit-cohort.test.js
// "admin cohort-bypass re-verifies the LIVE admin claim").
if (process.env.JEST_WORKER_ID && !process.env.AUTH_FORCE_LIVE_ADMIN_CHECK) {
return true;
}
Iif (!uid) return false;
const cached = adminClaimCache.get(uid);
if (cached && Date.now() < cached.expiresAt) {
return cached.isAdmin;
}
try {
const userRecord = await auth.getUser(uid);
const isAdmin = userRecord?.customClaims?.admin === true;
adminClaimCache.set(uid, { isAdmin, expiresAt: Date.now() + ADMIN_CLAIM_TTL });
evictOldest(adminClaimCache);
return isAdmin;
} catch (err) {
log.error('auth', 'Admin-claim re-fetch failed', { uid, error: err.message });
return false;
}
}
/**
* Admin guard — call at the top of admin route handlers.
*
* Returns true if blocked (response already sent), false if admin.
*
* Two-layer check:
* 1. Fast: `req.auth.token.admin` (decoded ID token claim).
* 2. Live: `auth.getUser(uid).customClaims.admin` via 60s TTL cache.
*
* The live check closes the privilege-leak window left by step 1 alone:
* if the token shows `admin:true` but the live claim is `false`, the
* admin was demoted within the last ~hour and the request must be denied.
*
* Async — every caller does `if (await requireAdmin(req, res)) return;`.
*/
async function requireAdmin(req, res) {
// Audit L2 (Phase 2A): defensive optional-chaining all the way down.
// Fail closed on undefined req.auth/token rather than crashing.
if (!req.auth?.token?.admin) {
res.status(403).json({ error: 'Admin access required' });
return true;
}
// Phase 2H finding #2: re-check the live customClaims so a demoted admin
// can't keep using their not-yet-expired token. Worst-case window is
// ADMIN_CLAIM_TTL (60s) instead of the full token lifetime (~1h).
const liveAdmin = await isLiveAdmin(req.auth.uid);
if (!liveAdmin) {
res.status(403).json({ error: 'Admin access required' });
return true;
}
return false;
}
function clearSuspensionCache(uniqueId) {
// Guard on `=== undefined` (a genuine no-arg call), NOT truthiness: unlike the
// string uids the sibling helpers take, uniqueId can arrive as Number(badId) →
// NaN (e.g. identity-graph.js), and `if (NaN)` truthiness would wrongly wipe
// the whole cache. A passed 0/NaN/null falls to the targeted delete (a safe
// no-op) instead.
if (uniqueId === undefined) {
// No id → clear everything (mirrors clearUniqueIdCache/clearAdminClaimCache),
// so the no-arg clearAuthCaches() test-isolation helper actually empties it.
// suspensionInFlight is cleared for mirror-consistency; the no-arg path runs
// between requests (test isolation) so there is no in-flight entry to drop —
// the production ban/unban-during-traffic case goes through the targeted
// branch below.
suspensionCache.clear();
suspensionInFlight.clear();
} else {
suspensionCache.delete(uniqueId);
// Also drop any inflight Promise so the NEXT caller refetches from
// Firestore (the inflight Promise was about to resolve to the OLD value).
suspensionInFlight.delete(uniqueId);
}
}
/**
* Drop the cached admin claim for a uid. Call immediately after
* `setCustomUserClaims({admin: false})` (or {admin: true} for a promotion)
* so the next request re-fetches the live value instead of waiting for
* the 60s TTL to expire.
*/
function clearAdminClaimCache(uid) {
if (uid) {
adminClaimCache.delete(uid);
} else {
adminClaimCache.clear();
}
}
/** Clear uniqueId cache entry — call after firebaseUid is updated. */
function clearUniqueIdCache(uid) {
if (uid) {
uniqueIdCache.delete(uid);
uniqueIdInFlight.delete(uid);
} else {
uniqueIdCache.clear();
uniqueIdInFlight.clear();
}
}
/** Update uniqueId cache — call after sign-in resolves a new mapping. */
function updateUniqueIdCache(uid, uniqueId) {
uniqueIdCache.set(uid, { uniqueId, expiresAt: Date.now() + CACHE_TTL });
evictOldest(uniqueIdCache);
}
module.exports = {
authMiddleware,
allowsMissingIdentity,
hasResolvedIdentity,
PRE_IDENTITY_ROUTES,
authMiddlewareStrict,
requireAdmin,
isLiveAdmin,
// Exported for the SSE fan-out (SHY-0169): a stream is ONE request, so the
// middleware's suspension check runs once and then never again for the life
// of a long connection. The fan-out re-checks per delivery.
checkSuspension,
clearSuspensionCache,
clearUniqueIdCache,
clearAdminClaimCache,
// Re-exported from utils/bans so middleware consumers (tests, admin
// routes already importing from here) have one import surface.
clearBanCache,
updateUniqueIdCache,
resolveUniqueId,
};
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