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* Admin-side age-verification routes (PR 4b/14).
*
* GET /api/admin/age-verification/pending
* List all pending submissions (oldest first).
*
* POST /api/admin/age-verification/:id/approve
* Body: { reason: string }
* Marks the submission approved. Flips `ageVerified=true` on the
* target user, records `ageVerifiedAt` + `ageVerificationMethod`.
* Best-effort: deletes R2 ID image and writes audit-log entry.
*
* POST /api/admin/age-verification/:id/reject
* Body: { reason: string }
* Marks the submission rejected. User stays unverified. Image is
* still deleted (privacy: spec required image destruction on
* decision regardless of outcome). Writes audit entry.
*
* POST /api/admin/age-verification/:id/modify-dob
* Body: { newDob: number (ms), reason: string }
* Updates `users/<uid>.dateOfBirth` to the new value. If the new
* DOB makes the user 18+, behaves like approve. If <18, the
* account is reverted to unverified — they age in. PMs lock-out
* is downstream (PR 11 migration). DOB plausibility (1900 ≤ dob
* ≤ now) is validated PRE-transaction; an implausible DOB cannot
* get past the user-doc mutation only to fail at the audit-log
* stage.
*
* Concurrency: each decision endpoint uses `db.runTransaction(...)`
* to atomically read submission + user docs and write both updates.
*
* Partial-failure contract: the route returns success with explicit
* `auditWritten` / `imageDeleted` flags when post-commit cleanup
* partially fails. The Firestore decision is the source of truth;
* a failed audit-log write or R2 deletion is logged for ops sweep
* and surfaced to the admin UI via the response flags rather than
* masked as a 500. Crash-window between the transaction commit and
* the post-commit cleanup leaves the decision recorded with no
* audit / a leaked image — see follow-up task for a reconciliation
* job that detects gaps.
*
* Submission-doc lifecycle: after a decision commits, the
* `r2Key` field is set to null in the same transaction so a future
* reader (admin audit-trail tab) doesn't see a stale reference to a
* deleted object. The original key is preserved in the audit-log
* entry for compliance traceability.
*/
const express = require('express');
const router = express.Router();
// FCM push helper (PR 10) — sends a data-only push to the user's
// stored fcmTokens after each decision so the Android service renders
// a local notification when the app is backgrounded. Best-effort —
// failures surface via the partial-failure response shape, not a 500.
const { db, auth, FieldValue } = require('../utils/firebase');
const r2 = require('../utils/r2');
const audit = require('../utils/age-verification-audit');
const systemPm = require('../utils/age-verification-system-pm');
const fcmPush = require('../utils/age-verification-fcm');
const { mintClaimsMerging, effectiveCohort } = require('../utils/firebase-claims');
const { now } = require('../utils/helpers');
const log = require('../utils/log');
const { requireAdmin } = require('../middleware/auth');
// Phase 2H finding #2 dedup: scope admin guard by path prefix.
const _adminGuardWrapper = async (req, res, next) => {
if (await requireAdmin(req, res)) return;
next();
};
router.use('/admin/age-verification', _adminGuardWrapper);
function isAtLeast18FromDob(dateOfBirthMs) {
Iif (typeof dateOfBirthMs !== 'number' || !Number.isFinite(dateOfBirthMs)) return false;
const today = new Date();
const dob = new Date(dateOfBirthMs);
let age = today.getUTCFullYear() - dob.getUTCFullYear();
Iif (
today.getUTCMonth() < dob.getUTCMonth() ||
(today.getUTCMonth() === dob.getUTCMonth() && today.getUTCDate() < dob.getUTCDate())
) {
age -= 1;
}
return age >= 18;
}
async function deleteImageBestEffort(r2Key, submissionId) {
Iif (!r2Key) return true;
try {
await r2.deleteObject(r2Key);
return true;
} catch (err) {
log.error('admin-age-verification', 'R2 image deletion failed', {
submissionId,
r2Key,
error: err?.message,
});
return false;
}
}
async function writeAuditBestEffort(action, submissionId, payload) {
try {
await action(db, payload);
return true;
} catch (err) {
log.error('admin-age-verification', 'Audit-log write failed', {
submissionId,
payload,
error: err?.message,
});
return false;
}
}
async function sendPmBestEffort(action, submissionId, args) {
// Same partial-failure shape as audit / R2 — a failed PM doesn't
// roll back the decision. Surfaced via the response so the admin
// UI can flag "decision committed, user not notified".
try {
await action(...args);
return true;
} catch (err) {
log.error('admin-age-verification', 'System PM send failed', {
submissionId,
error: err?.message,
});
return false;
}
}
function requireNonBlankReason(reason) {
return typeof reason === 'string' && reason.trim().length > 0;
}
// ─── GET /pending ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
router.get('/admin/age-verification/pending', async (req, res) => {
Iif (await requireAdmin(req, res)) return;
try {
const snap = await db
.collection('ageVerificationSubmissions')
.where('status', '==', 'pending')
.orderBy('submittedAt', 'asc')
.get();
const submissions = snap.docs.map((d) => ({ id: d.id, ...d.data() }));
return res.json({ submissions });
} catch (err) {
log.error('admin-age-verification', 'list pending failed', { error: err?.message });
return res
.status(500)
.json({ error: 'Failed to list pending submissions', errorId: 'AGE_VERIF_LIST' });
}
});
// ─── GET /:id/image-url ─────────────────────────────────────────────
//
// Returns a short-lived signed URL the admin browser can use to view
// the submitted ID image directly from R2. Stored privately; no
// long-lived URLs leave the API surface. 5-minute expiry mirrors the
// upload PUT URL.
//
// Returns 404 if the submission's r2Key is null — that happens after
// a decision commits (key is wiped post-decision; the image is also
// deleted from R2 best-effort).
router.get('/admin/age-verification/:id/image-url', async (req, res) => {
Iif (await requireAdmin(req, res)) return;
const { id } = req.params;
try {
const subRef = db.doc(`ageVerificationSubmissions/${id}`);
const snap = await subRef.get();
if (!snap.exists) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Submission not found' });
}
const data = snap.data();
if (!data.r2Key) {
// Post-decision: image has been deleted (best-effort) and key
// wiped from the doc. Admin can still read the audit log for
// compliance traceability.
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Image already removed' });
}
const url = await r2.getSignedGetUrl(data.r2Key, 300);
return res.json({ url, expiresInSec: 300 });
} catch (err) {
log.error('admin-age-verification', 'image-url failed', {
submissionId: id,
error: err?.message,
});
return res
.status(500)
.json({ error: 'Failed to issue image URL', errorId: 'AGE_VERIF_IMAGE_URL' });
}
});
// ─── POST /:id/approve ──────────────────────────────────────────────
router.post('/admin/age-verification/:id/approve', async (req, res) => {
Iif (await requireAdmin(req, res)) return;
const { id } = req.params;
const errorId = 'AGE_VERIF_APPROVE';
try {
// Approve does NOT require a reason. Original spec only asked for
// an admin justification on outcomes the user needs explained
// (Reject / DOB-modified). Approve is the "everything is fine"
// path; the audit log records WHO approved + WHEN, sufficient for
// the compliance trail. (Question 1 from 2026-05-04 spec
// follow-up — revisit if regulators ever ask for it.)
let submission;
let approved = false;
await db.runTransaction(async (tx) => {
const subRef = db.doc(`ageVerificationSubmissions/${id}`);
const subSnap = await tx.get(subRef);
if (!subSnap.exists) return;
const data = subSnap.data();
if (data.status !== 'pending') {
submission = { ...data, _conflict: true };
return;
}
submission = { ...data, id };
tx.update(subRef, {
status: 'approved',
decisionAt: now(),
decidedBy: req.auth.uniqueId,
// r2Key tombstoned — original preserved in audit-log entry.
r2Key: null,
});
tx.update(db.doc(`users/${data.userId}`), {
ageVerified: true,
ageVerifiedAt: now(),
ageVerificationMethod: data.idMethod,
});
approved = true;
});
if (!submission) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Submission not found' });
if (submission._conflict) return res.status(409).json({ error: 'Submission already decided' });
Iif (!approved) return res.status(500).json({ error: 'Approval did not commit', errorId });
const imageDeleted = await deleteImageBestEffort(submission.r2Key, id);
const auditWritten = await writeAuditBestEffort(audit.logVerificationApproved, id, {
adminUid: req.auth.uniqueId,
targetUserId: submission.userId,
method: submission.idMethod,
});
const userNotified = await sendPmBestEffort(systemPm.sendAgeVerificationApprovedPm, id, [
submission.userId,
submission.idMethod,
]);
// FCM push (PR 10) — best-effort, separate failure flag.
const pushNotified = await fcmPush.sendAgeVerificationApprovedPush(submission.userId);
return res.json({ ok: true, imageDeleted, auditWritten, userNotified, pushNotified });
} catch (err) {
log.error('admin-age-verification', `${errorId} failed`, { id, error: err?.message });
return res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to approve submission', errorId });
}
});
// ─── POST /:id/reject ───────────────────────────────────────────────
router.post('/admin/age-verification/:id/reject', async (req, res) => {
Iif (await requireAdmin(req, res)) return;
const { id } = req.params;
const errorId = 'AGE_VERIF_REJECT';
try {
const reason = (req.body?.reason || '').toString();
if (!requireNonBlankReason(reason)) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'reason is required' });
}
let submission;
let rejected = false;
await db.runTransaction(async (tx) => {
const subRef = db.doc(`ageVerificationSubmissions/${id}`);
const subSnap = await tx.get(subRef);
Iif (!subSnap.exists) return;
const data = subSnap.data();
if (data.status !== 'pending') {
submission = { ...data, _conflict: true };
return;
}
submission = { ...data, id };
tx.update(subRef, {
status: 'rejected',
decisionAt: now(),
decidedBy: req.auth.uniqueId,
decisionReason: reason,
r2Key: null,
});
// User doc intentionally NOT touched — they stay unverified.
rejected = true;
});
Iif (!submission) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Submission not found' });
if (submission._conflict) return res.status(409).json({ error: 'Submission already decided' });
Iif (!rejected) return res.status(500).json({ error: 'Rejection did not commit', errorId });
const imageDeleted = await deleteImageBestEffort(submission.r2Key, id);
const auditWritten = await writeAuditBestEffort(audit.logVerificationRejected, id, {
adminUid: req.auth.uniqueId,
targetUserId: submission.userId,
reason,
});
const userNotified = await sendPmBestEffort(systemPm.sendAgeVerificationRejectedPm, id, [
submission.userId,
reason,
]);
const pushNotified = await fcmPush.sendAgeVerificationRejectedPush(submission.userId, reason);
return res.json({ ok: true, imageDeleted, auditWritten, userNotified, pushNotified });
} catch (err) {
log.error('admin-age-verification', `${errorId} failed`, { id, error: err?.message });
return res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to reject submission', errorId });
}
});
// ─── POST /:id/modify-dob ───────────────────────────────────────────
router.post('/admin/age-verification/:id/modify-dob', async (req, res) => {
Iif (await requireAdmin(req, res)) return;
const { id } = req.params;
const errorId = 'AGE_VERIF_MODIFY_DOB';
try {
const newDob = req.body?.newDob;
const reason = (req.body?.reason || '').toString();
if (typeof newDob !== 'number' || !Number.isFinite(newDob)) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'newDob is required (ms epoch)' });
}
// Plausibility: 1900 <= newDob <= now. Throws if out of range.
// Validated up-front so an implausible DOB never reaches the user
// doc — without this, the transaction would commit the bogus
// value, then the audit-log helper's bounds check would throw and
// the route would 500 with the mutation already persisted.
try {
audit.requirePlausibleDob(newDob, 'newDob');
} catch (err) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: err.message });
}
if (!requireNonBlankReason(reason)) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'reason is required' });
}
let submission;
let oldDob;
let committed = false;
let targetUserData = null;
let targetFirebaseUid = null;
let newCohort = 'minor';
let clearedEdgeCount = 0;
await db.runTransaction(async (tx) => {
const subRef = db.doc(`ageVerificationSubmissions/${id}`);
const subSnap = await tx.get(subRef);
Iif (!subSnap.exists) return;
const data = subSnap.data();
Iif (data.status !== 'pending') {
submission = { ...data, _conflict: true };
return;
}
submission = { ...data, id };
const userRef = db.doc(`users/${data.userId}`);
const userSnap = await tx.get(userRef);
const userData = userSnap.exists ? userSnap.data() : null;
oldDob = userData?.dateOfBirth ?? null;
const verifiedNow = isAtLeast18FromDob(newDob);
newCohort = verifiedNow ? 'adult' : 'minor';
// UK OSA #17 PR 6 — runtime equivalent of migrate-segregation-
// relationships.js. When a cohort flips (admin DOB modification can
// take a user adult→minor or minor→adult), the user's existing
// follow edges that are now cross-cohort MUST be cleared in the
// same transaction as the cohort write. The one-shot migration
// script only handles legacy data; without this runtime hook the
// flip leaves cross-cohort edges live, which fails j19's OSA
// invariant probe and would violate the same compliance contract
// in prod. We batch all counterparty reads BEFORE any writes —
// Firestore transactions forbid reads after writes.
const oldCohort = userData?.cohort ?? null;
const counterpartyEdges = [];
if (oldCohort && oldCohort !== newCohort && userData) {
const followingIds = Array.isArray(userData.followingIds) ? userData.followingIds : [];
const followerIds = Array.isArray(userData.followerIds) ? userData.followerIds : [];
const uniqueCounterparties = [...new Set([...followingIds, ...followerIds])];
const counterpartySnaps = await Promise.all(
uniqueCounterparties.map((counterpartyId) => tx.get(db.doc(`users/${counterpartyId}`))),
);
const cohortByCounterparty = new Map();
counterpartySnaps.forEach((snap, idx) => {
Eif (snap.exists) {
cohortByCounterparty.set(uniqueCounterparties[idx], snap.data()?.cohort ?? null);
}
});
// Exempt SHYTALK_OFFICIAL accounts: the migration script preserves
// Officia's cross-cohort edges intentionally so system PMs can reach
// users of any cohort. Apply the same exemption at runtime.
const userIsOfficial = userData.userType === 'SHYTALK_OFFICIAL' || userData.isOfficial;
for (const targetId of followingIds) {
const c = cohortByCounterparty.get(targetId);
if (!c || c === newCohort) continue;
const targetSnap = counterpartySnaps[uniqueCounterparties.indexOf(targetId)];
const targetIsOfficial =
targetSnap?.exists &&
(targetSnap.data()?.userType === 'SHYTALK_OFFICIAL' || targetSnap.data()?.isOfficial);
Iif (userIsOfficial || targetIsOfficial) continue;
counterpartyEdges.push({ direction: 'following', counterpartyId: targetId });
}
for (const sourceId of followerIds) {
const c = cohortByCounterparty.get(sourceId);
Iif (!c || c === newCohort) continue;
const sourceSnap = counterpartySnaps[uniqueCounterparties.indexOf(sourceId)];
const sourceIsOfficial =
sourceSnap?.exists &&
(sourceSnap.data()?.userType === 'SHYTALK_OFFICIAL' || sourceSnap.data()?.isOfficial);
Iif (userIsOfficial || sourceIsOfficial) continue;
counterpartyEdges.push({ direction: 'follower', counterpartyId: sourceId });
}
}
tx.update(subRef, {
status: 'dob_modified',
decisionAt: now(),
decidedBy: req.auth.uniqueId,
decisionReason: reason,
oldDob,
newDob,
r2Key: null,
});
tx.update(userRef, {
dateOfBirth: newDob,
ageVerified: verifiedNow,
ageVerifiedAt: verifiedNow ? now() : null,
ageVerificationMethod: verifiedNow ? data.idMethod : null,
// PR 11 PM-lock side effect. New DOB <18 → lock the user out
// of PMs (their list hides + counterparties see disabled
// input). New DOB ≥18 → unlock. Same transaction so the
// ageVerified flip and the lock state can never diverge.
pmLocked: !verifiedNow,
// UK OSA #17 PR 2: cohort follows the same predicate.
// Same transaction so cohort + pmLocked can never diverge.
cohort: newCohort,
});
// Cross-cohort edge cleanup writes — mirror the migration script's
// both-sides arrayRemove pattern so neither side retains a dangling
// reference (a one-sided clean leaves a phantom follower count on
// the surviving side, which a cohort-segregation audit would flag).
for (const edge of counterpartyEdges) {
if (edge.direction === 'following') {
tx.update(userRef, { followingIds: FieldValue.arrayRemove(edge.counterpartyId) });
tx.update(db.doc(`users/${edge.counterpartyId}`), {
followerIds: FieldValue.arrayRemove(userData.uniqueId),
});
} else {
tx.update(userRef, { followerIds: FieldValue.arrayRemove(edge.counterpartyId) });
tx.update(db.doc(`users/${edge.counterpartyId}`), {
followingIds: FieldValue.arrayRemove(userData.uniqueId),
});
}
}
clearedEdgeCount = counterpartyEdges.length;
// Capture for the post-commit claim mint. Effective-cohort
// computation must see the NEW cohort but the EXISTING
// override (admin cohortOverride survives a DOB change).
targetUserData = userData ? { ...userData, cohort: newCohort } : { cohort: newCohort };
targetFirebaseUid =
userData && typeof userData.firebaseUid === 'string' ? userData.firebaseUid : null;
committed = true;
});
Iif (!submission) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Submission not found' });
Iif (submission._conflict) return res.status(409).json({ error: 'Submission already decided' });
Iif (!committed)
return res.status(500).json({ error: 'DOB modification did not commit', errorId });
// UK OSA #17 PR 2: claim mint after Firestore commits. No
// forceTokenRefresh round-trip — the target user is not the
// caller; the next sign-in's pm-lock-check round-trip catches
// up. Partial-failure flag surfaced for admin UI alerting.
//
// Security defense (review MEDIUM #3): when the mint fails the
// target user's JWT is stale relative to the new Firestore
// cohort. For the DOB→minor case this means a now-minor user
// can read adult-cohort data via the stale claim until ~1h of
// auto-refresh closes the window. We revoke refresh tokens on
// mint failure so the next ID-token request from the client
// must re-authenticate — and re-authentication runs through
// the sign-in mint, closing the gap immediately.
let claimMinted = false;
Eif (typeof targetFirebaseUid === 'string') {
try {
await mintClaimsMerging(targetFirebaseUid, { cohort: effectiveCohort(targetUserData) });
claimMinted = true;
} catch (_mintErr) {
claimMinted = false;
try {
await auth.revokeRefreshTokens(targetFirebaseUid);
} catch (_revokeErr) {
// Best-effort defence in depth — if revoke also fails,
// we've already surfaced claimMinted:false and the
// ~1h JWT TTL is the worst-case staleness window.
}
}
}
const imageDeleted = await deleteImageBestEffort(submission.r2Key, id);
const auditWritten = await writeAuditBestEffort(audit.logVerificationDobModified, id, {
adminUid: req.auth.uniqueId,
targetUserId: submission.userId,
oldDob,
newDob,
reason,
});
const userNotified = await sendPmBestEffort(systemPm.sendAgeVerificationDobModifiedPm, id, [
submission.userId,
{
ageVerified: isAtLeast18FromDob(newDob),
method: submission.idMethod,
reason,
},
]);
const pushNotified = await fcmPush.sendAgeVerificationDobModifiedPush(
submission.userId,
isAtLeast18FromDob(newDob),
);
return res.json({
ok: true,
ageVerified: isAtLeast18FromDob(newDob),
imageDeleted,
auditWritten,
userNotified,
pushNotified,
claimMinted,
// OSA #17 PR 6 runtime cleanup count — surfaced so the admin UI
// can show the audit trail (e.g., "downgraded Hayato to minor;
// cleared 2 cross-cohort follow edges").
crossCohortEdgesCleared: clearedEdgeCount,
});
} catch (err) {
log.error('admin-age-verification', `${errorId} failed`, { id, error: err?.message });
return res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to modify DOB', errorId });
}
});
module.exports = router;
|