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* Support tickets — SHY-0380.
*
* POST /api/support-tickets raise one (authenticated user)
* GET /api/support-tickets list (admin only)
* PATCH /api/support-tickets/:id resolve + internal note (admin only)
*
* Why this exists: the age-restriction dialog offered a "Contact support" button
* wired to the dismiss action, so it did nothing. The operator's decision was a
* ticket an admin can action, not an email — an email leaves support with no
* queue, no status and no audit trail, and fails outright on a device with no
* mail app.
*
* Shaped deliberately on the existing appeals queue (`routes/reports.js:1363`):
* validate, refuse a duplicate while one is still open, write with a generated
* id. ShyTalk already has two user→admin queues (reports, appeals); a third
* differently-shaped one would be the wrong outcome.
*
* This admin-dashboard surface is INTERIM by design. EPIC-0012 replaces it with
* a support-agent role working from the website portal, so this must not grow
* features that epic will own — no reply path, no assignment, no lifecycle
* beyond open/resolved.
*/
const router = require('express').Router();
const { db, FieldValue } = require('../utils/firebase');
const { getDoc, queryDocs } = require('../utils/firestore-helpers');
const { generateId, now } = require('../utils/helpers');
const { isLiveAdmin, requireAdmin, resolveUniqueId } = require('../middleware/auth');
const {
REPORT_ORIGIN,
ReportDocumentError,
buildReportDocument,
} = require('../utils/report-document');
const { attachmentKeysOf } = require('../utils/support-retention');
const {
deleteObject,
getObject,
getSignedPutUrl,
headObject,
pipeToResponse,
} = require('../utils/r2');
const { refusalForStoredObject } = require('../utils/attachment-limits');
const { scanAttachment } = require('../utils/attachment-scan');
const { writeLimiter } = require('../middleware/rateLimit');
const log = require('../utils/log');
const { openTicketsPayload } = require('../utils/support-open-tickets');
const COLLECTION = 'supportTickets';
/**
* Bounded explicitly rather than truncated. Silently cutting somebody's message
* in half loses the part they cared about and tells them nothing.
*/
const MAX_MESSAGE_LENGTH = 1000;
const MAX_ADMIN_NOTE_LENGTH = 2000;
/**
* Categories exist to help triage, so the set is closed.
*
* `bug` is SHY-0387's sixth approved category ("Something is broken"). The other
* five predate it. The app's `SupportCategory` enum mirrors this list exactly —
* a value here with no counterpart there is a category nobody can choose.
*/
const CATEGORIES = ['age', 'account', 'payment', 'safety', 'bug', 'other'];
/**
* What somebody may attach — SHY-0387. The operator asked for screenshots AND
* videos, so the set spans both.
*/
const ATTACHMENT_CONTENT_TYPES = new Map([
['image/jpeg', 'jpg'],
['image/png', 'png'],
['image/webp', 'webp'],
['video/mp4', 'mp4'],
['video/quicktime', 'mov'],
]);
/**
* Bounded because each attachment is an object an admin has to open. Ten is
* generous for "show me the problem" and small enough that a ticket cannot be
* used to park a media library.
*/
const MAX_ATTACHMENTS = 10;
/**
* Refuse a caller we cannot identify — SHY-0426.
*
* `resolveUniqueId` answers null when a Firebase uid has no identityMap entry,
* and the auth middleware passes that through as `req.auth.uniqueId = null`.
* Nothing here treated null as "unknown"; it was used as though it were an
* account number. Because `null === null`, every ownership test in this file
* then passed for everybody at once:
*
* - `where('userId','==',null)` matched every unidentified caller's tickets
* - `doc.userId !== uniqueId` was false, so appends were allowed
* - `support-tickets/null/` was one shared attachment folder
*
* Reproduced against the real stack: two accounts read each other's support
* tickets — including the summary of a SAFETY report — and wrote into each
* other's. An account we cannot identify cannot be authorised for anything
* scoped to an account, so it is refused rather than guessed at.
*
* `Number.isInteger`, not a falsy test: uniqueId 0 is a real account and a
* `!uniqueId` guard would lock it out.
*
* This is the SUPPORT surface only. The same shape exists across 29 route
* files — see SHY-0426 for the central fix, which cannot simply reject in the
* middleware because account creation legitimately runs before an identity
* exists.
*/
function requireIdentity(req, res) {
if (Number.isInteger(req.auth?.uniqueId)) return false;
log.warn('support-tickets', 'Refused a caller with no resolved identity', {
uid: req.auth?.uid,
path: req.path,
});
res.status(403).json({ error: 'Your account could not be identified', code: 'no_identity' });
return true;
}
/** Every attachment key lives under the owner's own folder. */
const attachmentPrefix = (uniqueId) => `support-tickets/${uniqueId}/`;
/**
* Validate client-supplied R2 keys — the same three defences age-verification
* applies, for the same reason: the key comes from the client, so each one is a
* candidate route into somebody else's folder.
*
* 1. must sit under the caller's own prefix
* 2. must not contain `..` or `//` — the literal key stores as-is, but a
* downstream consumer (admin viewer, signed GET, CDN) may normalise it
* 3. the remainder must be a single segment, so a valid prefix cannot be
* extended into another account's directory
*
* @returns {{ok: true, keys: string[]} | {ok: false, error: string}}
*/
function validateAttachments(raw, uniqueId) {
if (raw === undefined || raw === null) return { ok: true, keys: [] };
if (!Array.isArray(raw)) return { ok: false, error: 'attachments must be a list' };
if (raw.length > MAX_ATTACHMENTS) {
return { ok: false, error: `at most ${MAX_ATTACHMENTS} attachments are allowed` };
}
const prefix = attachmentPrefix(uniqueId);
for (const key of raw) {
if (typeof key !== 'string' || key.length === 0) {
return { ok: false, error: 'each attachment must be an upload key' };
}
if (!key.startsWith(prefix) || key.includes('..') || key.includes('//')) {
return { ok: false, error: 'attachment does not belong to this account' };
}
if (key.slice(prefix.length).includes('/')) {
return { ok: false, error: 'attachment does not belong to this account' };
}
}
return { ok: true, keys: raw };
}
/**
* Check every attached object against the limits, from what is actually in
* storage (SHY-0420).
*
* Reads each object's type and size back from R2 rather than trusting the
* request: the request is the thing being checked, and a client that skipped
* the client-side rules would otherwise face nothing at all.
*
* Fails CLOSED. An object we cannot measure is refused — "we could not check"
* must never mean "it is fine" for a file a stranger uploaded and a member of
* staff will open.
*
* @returns {Promise<string|null>} a sentence for the caller, or null to accept
*/
async function refusalForAttachedObjects(keys) {
for (const key of keys) {
let head = null;
try {
head = await headObject(key);
} catch (err) {
log.warn('support-tickets', 'Could not measure an attachment', { key, error: err.message });
}
const refusal = refusalForStoredObject(head);
if (refusal) return refusal;
const scan = await scanAttachment(key);
Iif (!scan.clean) {
return `That file could not be accepted (${scan.reason ?? 'it did not pass a check'}).`;
}
}
return null;
}
const STATUS_OPEN = 'open';
/** How many open tickets the choice screen will ever show. More is unreadable. */
const MAX_OPEN_TICKETS_LISTED = 5;
/** Long enough to recognise the problem, short enough to scan. */
const SUMMARY_MAX_LENGTH = 120;
/**
* How many requests this person already has open — SHY-0396.
*
* Bounded by the same limit the choice screen uses, because the number is only
* ever read as "none / one / a few". An unbounded count would let somebody with
* a large history make ticket creation expensive.
*
* Never throws: this is observability, and losing the number must not cost
* somebody their ticket. `null` records honestly that it was not known.
*/
async function countOpenTickets(uniqueId) {
try {
const docs = await queryDocs(
db
.collection(COLLECTION)
.where('userId', '==', uniqueId)
.where('status', '==', STATUS_OPEN)
.limit(MAX_OPEN_TICKETS_LISTED),
);
return docs.length;
} catch (err) {
log.error('support-tickets', 'Counting open tickets failed', { error: err.message });
return null;
}
}
/** A shortened copy of the person's OWN message — never anybody else's. */
function summarise(message) {
const text = typeof message === 'string' ? message.trim() : '';
if (text.length <= SUMMARY_MAX_LENGTH) return text;
return text.slice(0, SUMMARY_MAX_LENGTH) + '\u2026';
}
const STATUS_RESOLVED = 'resolved';
/**
* Closed BECAUSE it became a report — SHY-0439.
*
* A distinct status rather than a flag on `resolved`, because a reopen path that
* has to remember to check a boolean is a reopen path that will one day forget.
* Reopening a safety matter would put it back in a queue that is not for safety
* matters, which is the problem SHY-0437 exists to solve.
*/
const STATUS_CONVERTED = 'converted_to_report';
/**
* Context fields the client may attach, as an ALLOWLIST.
*
* A denylist would be wrong here: it can only exclude the leaks somebody thought
* of, and this payload is written by the client. An allowlist means a field
* nobody anticipated is dropped rather than stored.
*/
const CONTEXT_ALLOWED_FIELDS = [
'feature',
'reason',
'screen',
'appVersion',
'platform',
// SHY-0437. Set when somebody read the report guide and chose to raise a
// ticket anyway. The acceptance signal for that ticket is the RATIO of people
// who go on to report against people who come here instead, and without this
// the ratio cannot be computed. An allowlist drops what it does not name, so
// the client can send this all it likes until it appears here.
'raisedAfterReportGuide',
];
/** Keep only the allowed context fields, coerced to short strings. */
function sanitiseContext(raw) {
if (!raw || typeof raw !== 'object' || Array.isArray(raw)) return {};
const out = {};
for (const field of CONTEXT_ALLOWED_FIELDS) {
const value = raw[field];
if (typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0) out[field] = value.slice(0, 200);
}
return out;
}
// ─── Issue an upload URL for an attachment ──────────────────────
/**
* The client PUTs the bytes straight to R2 with this short-lived signed URL, so
* the API never carries the file and never holds a long-lived storage
* credential. Same flow as age verification.
*/
router.post('/support-tickets/upload-url', writeLimiter, async (req, res) => {
try {
if (requireIdentity(req, res)) return;
const contentType = (req.body ?? {}).contentType;
if (typeof contentType !== 'string' || !ATTACHMENT_CONTENT_TYPES.has(contentType)) {
return res.status(400).json({
error: `contentType must be one of: ${[...ATTACHMENT_CONTENT_TYPES.keys()].join(', ')}`,
});
}
// The random component matters: R2 is bucket-private, but this flow HANDS
// the key back to the client, so a key derived only from the account id
// would let somebody who knows it name a stranger's past uploads.
const ext = ATTACHMENT_CONTENT_TYPES.get(contentType);
const r2Key = `${attachmentPrefix(req.auth.uniqueId)}${generateId()}.${ext}`;
const uploadUrl = await getSignedPutUrl(r2Key, contentType, UPLOAD_SLOT_TTL_SEC);
return res.json({ uploadUrl, r2Key, expiresInSec: UPLOAD_SLOT_TTL_SEC });
} catch (err) {
log.error('support-tickets', 'POST /api/support-tickets/upload-url failed', {
error: err.message,
});
return res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to issue upload URL' });
}
});
// ─── Remove an attachment before sending ────────────────────────
/**
* Delete an upload the person has taken off their form.
*
* The bytes go up the moment a file is PICKED, before Send is pressed. So a
* file removed from the form is already in the object store, and once the form
* drops the key nothing references it: no ticket carries it, so no retention
* rule and no erasure request will ever reach it.
*
* That is a data-protection problem rather than housekeeping. People attach
* screenshots of private conversations and video of other people to safety
* reports, and removing a file before sending is the moment somebody most
* reasonably believes it is gone. Keeping an orphaned copy indefinitely, for no
* purpose, is exactly what data minimisation forbids.
*
* The key comes from the CLIENT, so it gets the same three defences as the
* upload path: it must sit under the caller's own prefix, and must contain
* neither `..` nor `//`. Without that this endpoint would delete anything whose
* key a caller could guess.
*/
router.delete('/support-tickets/attachments', writeLimiter, async (req, res) => {
try {
if (requireIdentity(req, res)) return;
const r2Key = (req.body ?? {}).r2Key;
const check = validateAttachments([r2Key], req.auth.uniqueId);
if (!check.ok) return res.status(400).json({ error: check.error });
await deleteObject(r2Key);
log.info('support-tickets', 'attachment removed before sending', {
uniqueId: req.auth.uniqueId,
});
return res.json({ deleted: true });
} catch (err) {
// Reported, never swallowed. Answering 200 on a failed delete would tell
// somebody their file is gone while it is still there.
log.error('support-tickets', 'DELETE /api/support-tickets/attachments failed', {
error: err.message,
});
return res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to delete attachment' });
}
});
// ─── Raise a ticket ─────────────────────────────────────────────
router.post('/support-tickets', writeLimiter, async (req, res) => {
try {
if (requireIdentity(req, res)) return;
const body = req.body ?? {};
const message = body.message;
if (typeof message !== 'string' || message.trim().length === 0) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'message is required' });
}
if (message.length > MAX_MESSAGE_LENGTH) {
return res
.status(400)
.json({ error: `message must be at most ${MAX_MESSAGE_LENGTH} characters` });
}
const category = body.category;
if (category !== undefined && !CATEGORIES.includes(category)) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: `category must be one of: ${CATEGORIES.join(', ')}` });
}
// Identity comes from the verified token, NEVER from the payload. A body
// carrying its own userId is ignored, not honoured.
const uniqueId = req.auth.uniqueId;
const attachments = validateAttachments(body.attachments, uniqueId);
if (!attachments.ok) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: attachments.error });
}
// The limits, enforced HERE (SHY-0420).
//
// The client bounds these too — images by size, video by duration, refused
// before any upload starts so nobody spends a video's worth of mobile data
// to be told no. That is a courtesy to honest callers; it is not a bound.
// These files are opened by staff, and a minor cohort is present, so the
// rule has to hold for a caller who never ran our client at all.
//
// Measured from what was actually STORED rather than from what the request
// claims, because the request is the thing being checked.
const refusal = await refusalForAttachedObjects(attachments.keys);
if (refusal) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: refusal });
}
// SHY-0396: a second request is NEVER refused. Somebody with an open ticket
// may have a genuinely different problem, and refusing them means the new
// problem reaches nobody. The warning belongs in the client, which shows
// what is already open (GET /support-tickets/mine/open) and offers to add to
// it instead -- with the reminder that a duplicate for the SAME problem only
// goes to the back of the queue. This route used to answer 409 here, which
// blocked it outright.
//
// The same query the 409 used to run now RECORDS instead of refusing, so the
// warning's effect can be measured rather than assumed: a ticket with
// `openTicketsAtCreation > 0` was raised by somebody who had already been
// shown one. Counted SERVER-side deliberately -- a client-sent "I saw the
// warning" flag can be stale or simply untrue, and this costs nothing that
// the refusal did not already cost.
const openAtCreation = await countOpenTickets(uniqueId);
const ticketId = generateId();
await db.doc(`${COLLECTION}/${ticketId}`).set(
{
userId: uniqueId,
message: message.trim(),
category: category ?? 'other',
context: sanitiseContext(body.context),
attachments: attachments.keys,
openTicketsAtCreation: openAtCreation,
status: STATUS_OPEN,
resolvedBy: null,
resolvedAt: null,
adminNote: null,
createdAt: now(),
},
{ merge: true },
);
// Deliberately not logging the message body: a support request can contain
// anything, and logs are read by more people than the queue is.
log.info('support-tickets', 'Support ticket raised', {
ticketId,
uniqueId,
category,
attachmentCount: attachments.keys.length,
});
res.json({ success: true, ticketId });
} catch (err) {
log.error('support-tickets', 'POST /api/support-tickets failed', { error: err.message });
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
}
});
// ─── View a ticket's attachments (admin) ────────────────────────
/**
* Short-lived links for one ticket's attachments — SHY-0387.
*
* On demand rather than folded into the list, which returns up to 200 tickets:
* signing every attachment of every ticket would mean thousands of signatures
* per page load, nearly all of them for tickets nobody opens. Same shape as
* `admin-age-verification`, which signs an ID image only when an admin looks at
* it.
*
* The links expire. A link that does not is a permanent public URL to somebody's
* support attachment, handed out by an endpoint that is behind a bearer token
* precisely because the object should not be public.
*/
/**
* Same lifetime for the upload slot.
*
* Passed EXPLICITLY rather than relying on `getSignedPutUrl`'s default, because
* the response tells the client `expiresInSec` and the two would drift apart
* silently — the client would schedule against a lifetime the URL does not have,
* and uploads would start failing as an undiagnosable "upload failed".
*/
const UPLOAD_SLOT_TTL_SEC = 300;
// Rate-limited despite being a GET: each call mints up to MAX_ATTACHMENTS signed
// URLs, which makes it the cheapest signature-generation endpoint an
// authenticated token can loop on. Every other signing route here is limited.
/**
* The caller's own OPEN tickets, with a short summary of each — SHY-0396.
*
* Mounted BEFORE `/support-tickets/:id/...` so `mine` is never taken for an id.
*
* This exists so the client can warn instead of refuse. Somebody with a request
* already open is shown what it was about, reminded that a duplicate for the
* SAME problem only goes to the back of the queue, and then given the choice:
* add to that ticket, raise a new one, or go back. Without a summary there is
* nothing to recognise the problem by, and the choice is unanswerable.
*
* The summary is a shortened copy of their OWN words, so no new stored field is
* needed and nothing is revealed that they did not write.
*/
router.get('/support-tickets/mine/open', async (req, res) => {
try {
if (requireIdentity(req, res)) return;
const uniqueId = req.auth.uniqueId;
const docs = await queryDocs(
db
.collection(COLLECTION)
.where('userId', '==', uniqueId)
.where('status', '==', STATUS_OPEN)
.limit(MAX_OPEN_TICKETS_LISTED),
);
// Belt and braces on top of the query: a support queue holds other people's
// words, so ownership is re-checked here rather than trusted from the
// filter alone.
const tickets = docs
.filter((d) => d.userId === uniqueId)
.map((d) => ({
ticketId: d.id,
category: d.category ?? 'other',
summary: summarise(d.message),
createdAt: d.createdAt ?? null,
}));
// How many are actually open, which is NOT how many are shown (SHY-0424).
// The list above is capped at MAX_OPEN_TICKETS_LISTED for readability, and
// the client was deriving "You already have N requests open" from its
// length — so somebody with eight was told they had five.
//
// Counted server-side rather than by reading them all back: one
// aggregation, exact, and no second unbounded query over somebody's whole
// support history.
//
// A count that FAILS does not fail the listing. The summaries are the
// useful part, and `openTicketsPayload` states the absence rather than
// guessing from the list length, which is the defect itself.
let openCount = null;
try {
const counted = await db
.collection(COLLECTION)
.where('userId', '==', uniqueId)
.where('status', '==', STATUS_OPEN)
.count()
.get();
openCount = counted.data().count;
} catch (err) {
log.warn('support-tickets', 'Could not count open tickets; omitting the count', {
error: err.message,
});
}
res.json(openTicketsPayload(tickets, openCount));
} catch (err) {
log.error('support-tickets', 'Listing open tickets failed', { error: err.message });
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Could not load your open requests' });
}
});
/**
* Add to a ticket the caller already has — SHY-0396, "it's the problem I
* already reported".
*
* Without this the text has nowhere to go and would simply be dropped, which is
* the worst outcome for somebody who has already had to ask twice.
*/
// ─── Read one ticket (owner or admin) ───────────────────────────
/**
* SHY-0495. There was no by-id read at all: the list is admin-only, `mine/open`
* lists the caller's, and PATCH mutates — nothing returned a single ticket. A
* support agent opening one, and a person following up on their own, both need
* this.
*
* Declared AFTER `/support-tickets/mine/open` on purpose: `:id` would otherwise
* match the literal "mine" and swallow that route.
*
* Somebody else's ticket answers 404, not 403. A 403 confirms the ticket
* exists, and a support ticket can be ABOUT the person reading it, so existence
* itself is worth hiding — the same existence-hiding the cohort gate uses.
*/
router.get('/support-tickets/:id', async (req, res) => {
try {
Iif (requireIdentity(req, res)) return;
const ticket = await getDoc(`${COLLECTION}/${req.params.id}`);
if (!ticket) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Ticket not found' });
const isOwner = String(ticket.userId) === String(req.auth.uniqueId);
if (!isOwner && !(await isLiveAdmin(req.auth.uid))) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Ticket not found' });
}
res.json({ ticket });
} catch (err) {
log.error('support-tickets', 'GET /api/support-tickets/:id failed', { error: err.message });
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
}
});
router.post('/support-tickets/:id/messages', writeLimiter, async (req, res) => {
try {
if (requireIdentity(req, res)) return;
const uniqueId = req.auth.uniqueId;
const message = typeof req.body?.message === 'string' ? req.body.message.trim() : '';
if (!message) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'message is required' });
}
Iif (message.length > MAX_MESSAGE_LENGTH) {
return res
.status(400)
.json({ error: `message must be ${MAX_MESSAGE_LENGTH} characters or fewer` });
}
const snap = await db.doc(`${COLLECTION}/${req.params.id}`).get();
// A ticket belonging to somebody else answers 404, not 403: whether their
// ticket exists is not this caller's business.
if (!snap.exists || snap.data().userId !== uniqueId) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Support request not found' });
}
await db.doc(`${COLLECTION}/${req.params.id}`).update({
messages: FieldValue.arrayUnion({ message, addedAt: now(), addedBy: uniqueId }),
updatedAt: now(),
});
log.info('support-tickets', 'Message added to an existing ticket', {
ticketId: req.params.id,
uniqueId,
});
res.json({ success: true, ticketId: req.params.id });
} catch (err) {
log.error('support-tickets', 'Adding to a ticket failed', { error: err.message });
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Could not add to your request' });
}
});
router.get('/support-tickets/:id/attachments', writeLimiter, async (req, res) => {
try {
if (await requireAdmin(req, res)) return;
const doc = await db.doc(`${COLLECTION}/${req.params.id}`).get();
if (!doc.exists) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Ticket not found' });
}
// Tickets raised before SHY-0387 have no `attachments` field at all, so an
// absent one is an empty list rather than a crash.
const keys = doc.data().attachments ?? [];
// VIEWABLE, not retrievable (SHY-0420).
//
// This used to mint a signed GET URL per key, which is a download link: a
// moderator could pull an arbitrary stranger's file — often a photograph
// of a real person, sometimes of abuse — onto their own machine, and once
// it is there we have no further say in it.
//
// The admin UI now asks for each attachment through
// `/support-tickets/:id/attachments/:index`, which streams it back
// inline. No URL the browser can hand to a download manager, no link that
// outlives the session, and every view goes through a route that knows who
// is asking.
return res.json({
attachments: keys.map((key, index) => ({
index,
viewUrl: `/api/support-tickets/${req.params.id}/attachments/${index}`,
contentType: null,
})),
});
} catch (err) {
log.error('support-tickets', 'GET /api/support-tickets/:id/attachments failed', {
error: err.message,
});
return res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
}
});
/**
* Stream ONE attachment back for viewing (SHY-0420).
*
* `Content-Disposition: inline` and no signed URL anywhere: the file is shown,
* not handed over. A moderator needs to SEE what somebody attached in order to
* act on it; they do not need a copy of it on their laptop, and the difference
* matters most for exactly the files this route carries.
*
* Addressed by INDEX rather than by key, so an admin cannot ask for an
* arbitrary object by naming it — the ticket decides which objects exist.
*/
router.get('/support-tickets/:id/attachments/:index', writeLimiter, async (req, res) => {
try {
Iif (await requireAdmin(req, res)) return;
const doc = await db.doc(`${COLLECTION}/${req.params.id}`).get();
Iif (!doc.exists) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Ticket not found' });
const keys = doc.data().attachments ?? [];
const index = Number(req.params.index);
Eif (!Number.isInteger(index) || index < 0 || index >= keys.length) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Attachment not found' });
}
const object = await getObject(keys[index]);
if (!object || !object.Body) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Attachment not found' });
// Inline, and never as an attachment download. `nosniff` stops a browser
// deciding a file is something more interesting than we said it was, and
// `no-store` keeps it out of a shared cache on the way.
res.setHeader('Content-Type', object.ContentType || 'application/octet-stream');
res.setHeader('Content-Disposition', 'inline');
res.setHeader('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'no-store');
// Streamed rather than buffered: these are photographs and video, and
// holding one in memory per moderator view is a needless cost.
// SHY-0501: destroyed if the moderator closes the video before it ends,
// or the socket leaks in CLOSE_WAIT and fifty of them stop storage dead.
return pipeToResponse(object.Body, res);
} catch (err) {
log.error('support-tickets', 'GET attachment stream failed', { error: err.message });
return res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
}
});
// ─── List tickets (admin) ───────────────────────────────────────
router.get('/support-tickets', async (req, res) => {
try {
if (await requireAdmin(req, res)) return;
const status = req.query.status;
const LISTABLE_STATUSES = [STATUS_OPEN, STATUS_RESOLVED, STATUS_CONVERTED];
if (status !== undefined && !LISTABLE_STATUSES.includes(status)) {
return res.status(400).json({
error: `status must be one of: ${LISTABLE_STATUSES.map((s) => `"${s}"`).join(', ')}`,
});
}
const userId = req.query.userId;
Iif (userId !== undefined && (typeof userId !== 'string' || userId.trim() === '')) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'userId must be a non-empty string' });
}
let query = db.collection(COLLECTION);
if (status) query = query.where('status', '==', status);
if (userId) {
// Compared as a NUMBER when it is one. Tickets store `userId: uniqueId`,
// an integer, and mine/open compares against the raw uniqueId --
// so coercing to a string matches nothing, silently, returning an empty
// list that reads exactly like "this person has no tickets".
const asNumber = Number(userId);
const value = Number.isInteger(asNumber) && String(asNumber) === userId ? asNumber : userId;
query = query.where('userId', '==', value);
}
// SHY-0495: the ORDER is dropped when filtering by user, on purpose.
//
// `where('userId') + orderBy('createdAt')` needs a COMPOSITE index, and
// supportTickets has none defined -- so it would pass against the emulator
// and fail at runtime on dev, which is the worst place to find out.
// Multiple equality filters are served from single-field indexes, so the
// filtered query needs no new index.
//
// Nothing is lost: unordered is what "all of this person's tickets" wants.
// The unfiltered list keeps its newest-first window, which is what a
// triage queue wants.
if (!userId) query = query.orderBy('createdAt', 'desc');
const tickets = await queryDocs(query.limit(200));
res.json({ tickets });
} catch (err) {
log.error('support-tickets', 'GET /api/support-tickets failed', { error: err.message });
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
}
});
// ─── Resolve a ticket (admin) ───────────────────────────────────
router.patch('/support-tickets/:id', async (req, res) => {
try {
if (await requireAdmin(req, res)) return;
const body = req.body ?? {};
if (body.status !== STATUS_RESOLVED) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: `status must be "${STATUS_RESOLVED}"` });
}
const adminNote = body.adminNote;
if (adminNote !== undefined) {
Iif (typeof adminNote !== 'string' || adminNote.length > MAX_ADMIN_NOTE_LENGTH) {
return res.status(400).json({
error: `adminNote must be a string of at most ${MAX_ADMIN_NOTE_LENGTH} characters`,
});
}
}
const ticket = await getDoc(`${COLLECTION}/${req.params.id}`);
if (!ticket) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Support ticket not found' });
// SHY-0439. Terminal means terminal: this ticket's conversation moved to
// moderation, and moving it back into the support queue would put a safety
// matter into a queue that is not for safety matters -- which is the whole
// problem SHY-0437 exists to solve. Refused here rather than only hidden in
// the admin UI, because a hidden control is a decision about one screen.
if (ticket.status === STATUS_CONVERTED) {
return res.status(409).json({
error: `This ticket became report ${ticket.convertedToReportId} and cannot be changed`,
});
}
const timestamp = now();
const update = {
status: STATUS_RESOLVED,
resolvedBy: req.auth.uid,
resolvedAt: timestamp,
};
if (adminNote !== undefined) update.adminNote = adminNote;
await db.doc(`${COLLECTION}/${req.params.id}`).update(update);
// Audit AFTER the write succeeds, and only then: an entry for an action that
// did not happen is worse than none. `PUT /config/:key` writes no audit entry
// at all, which is the gap this deliberately does not reproduce.
await db.collection('auditLog').add({
adminUid: req.auth.uniqueId,
action: 'support_ticket_resolve',
actionType: 'support_ticket_resolve',
targetType: 'support_ticket',
targetId: req.params.id,
details: { hasAdminNote: adminNote !== undefined },
timestamp,
});
res.json({ success: true });
} catch (err) {
log.error('support-tickets', 'PATCH /api/support-tickets/:id failed', { error: err.message });
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
}
});
/**
* Everything the person told us, in the order they told us — SHY-0438.
*
* A ticket is the opening message plus whatever they added afterwards
* (`messages`, appended by `POST /support-tickets/:id/messages`). A report
* carrying only the opening message is a report missing the half that arrived
* once they had thought about it, which for a safety matter is often the half
* that names what actually happened.
*/
function conversationText(ticket) {
const parts = [];
Eif (typeof ticket?.message === 'string' && ticket.message.trim().length > 0) {
parts.push(ticket.message.trim());
}
const followUps = Array.isArray(ticket?.messages) ? ticket.messages : [];
for (const entry of followUps) {
const text = typeof entry?.message === 'string' ? entry.message.trim() : '';
Eif (text.length > 0) parts.push(text);
}
return parts.join('\n\n');
}
/**
* Which of a ticket's attachments are no longer in storage.
*
* Reported AFTER the report is filed, never used to refuse it: evidence that
* has gone is a reason to tell the admin what is missing, not a reason to leave
* a safety report unfiled. A storage error is treated as missing, because from
* the moderator's point of view an object they cannot open is absent either way.
*/
async function missingAttachmentKeys(keys) {
const missing = [];
for (const key of keys) {
try {
const head = await headObject(key);
Iif (!head) missing.push(key);
} catch {
missing.push(key);
}
}
return missing;
}
// ─── Turn a ticket into a report (admin) ────────────────────────
/**
* The escape hatch from SHY-0437, made honest — SHY-0438.
*
* Somebody who could not manage the report flow raises a ticket instead, and an
* admin files the report for them. Without this the ticket is answered as
* correspondence: no moderation triage, no count against the reported person,
* nothing that catches a repeat pattern, and nothing that can be appealed.
*
* **"One click" has a limit that cannot be engineered away.** A report needs a
* reportedUserId and a reason; a ticket carries neither. Reading the text and
* deciding who it is about is the part only a person can do, so the admin
* supplies those two and everything else is carried across.
*
* The write order is the safety property: the report is created FIRST, and the
* ticket is closed only once that succeeded. A ticket closed permanently with
* no report filed is the worst outcome this flow has, and it is the one a
* convenient `Promise.all` would produce.
*/
router.post('/support-tickets/:id/convert-to-report', async (req, res) => {
try {
if (await requireAdmin(req, res)) return;
const body = req.body ?? {};
const { reportedUserId, reason, reportedUserName } = body;
if (typeof reportedUserId !== 'string' || reportedUserId.length === 0) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'reportedUserId is required' });
}
if (typeof reason !== 'string' || reason.length === 0) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'reason is required' });
}
const ticket = await getDoc(`${COLLECTION}/${req.params.id}`);
if (!ticket) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Support ticket not found' });
// Refused rather than repeated. Two reports for one ticket would count the
// same complaint twice against the reported person.
if (ticket.status === STATUS_CONVERTED) {
return res.status(409).json({
error: `This ticket has already been turned into report ${ticket.convertedToReportId}`,
});
}
// Server-authoritative, exactly as POST /reports does it: the suspension
// cascade keys off this value, so a caller-supplied one would let whoever
// holds the request choose which account an admin can suspend.
const reportedUserUniqueId = await resolveUniqueId(reportedUserId);
if (!reportedUserUniqueId) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'reportedUserId does not match any known user' });
}
// A reporter who has since been deleted must not break conversion: their
// words and evidence are still what moderation needs to act on.
const reporter = await getDoc(`users/${ticket.userId}`);
const reportId = generateId();
const timestamp = now();
let reportDocument;
try {
reportDocument = buildReportDocument({
reporterUniqueId: ticket.userId,
reporterName: reporter?.displayName ?? reporter?.display_name ?? null,
reporterDocUniqueId: reporter?.uniqueId ?? reporter?.unique_id ?? null,
reportedUserId,
reportedUserName: reportedUserName || null,
reportedUserUniqueId,
// Their own words, whole. A follow-up is part of what they told us, and
// a report carrying only the opening message is a report missing the
// half that arrived after they thought about it.
description: conversationText(ticket),
reason,
evidenceUrls: attachmentKeysOf(ticket),
origin: REPORT_ORIGIN.SUPPORT_TICKET,
sourceSupportTicketId: req.params.id,
createdAt: timestamp,
});
} catch (err) {
// Only what the builder itself refuses. Anything else is a fault in this
// route, and must reach the 500 handler rather than being dressed up as
// something the admin typed wrong.
Iif (!(err instanceof ReportDocumentError)) throw err;
return res.status(400).json({ error: err.message });
}
// FIRST. If this throws, the ticket is untouched and the person still has a
// ticket somebody can answer.
await db.doc(`reports/${reportId}`).set(reportDocument, { merge: true });
await db.doc(`${COLLECTION}/${req.params.id}`).update({
status: STATUS_CONVERTED,
convertedToReportId: reportId,
convertedBy: req.auth.uid,
convertedAt: timestamp,
});
await db.collection('auditLog').add({
adminUid: req.auth.uniqueId,
action: 'support_ticket_convert_to_report',
actionType: 'support_ticket_convert_to_report',
targetType: 'support_ticket',
targetId: req.params.id,
details: { reportId, reason },
timestamp,
});
// Reported after the fact rather than refused before it: evidence that has
// gone is a reason to tell the admin, not a reason to leave a safety report
// unfiled.
const missingAttachments = await missingAttachmentKeys(reportDocument.evidenceUrls);
res.json({ success: true, reportId, missingAttachments });
} catch (err) {
log.error('support-tickets', 'POST /api/support-tickets/:id/convert-to-report failed', {
error: err.message,
});
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
}
});
module.exports = router;
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