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2x 4x 4x 4x 8x 4x 4x 4x 9x 6x 6x 4x 4x 3x 1x 2x 2x 2x 2x 2x 2x 1x 1x 1x 1x 9x 5x 5x 4x 4x 4x 4x 1x 3x 3x 1x 2x 2x 2x 2x 9x 10x 10x 10x 10x 10x 9x 9x 2x 7x 1x 6x 6x 6x 6x 5x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 9x 8x 8x 8x 8x 7x 6x 6x 6x 1x 5x 4x 4x 2x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 9x 8x 8x 8x 8x 7x 6x 6x 6x 1x 5x 4x 4x 2x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 3x 9x 10x 10x 10x 10x 9x 1x 8x 7x 7x 7x 7x 6x 2x 4x 4x 4x 4x 1x 1x 1x 1x 3x 3x 3x 3x 4x 6x 6x 5x 5x 5x 6x 5x 5x 9x 15x 15x 14x 14x 14x 13x 1x 12x 12x 1x 11x 1x 10x 2x 2x 8x 1x 7x 7x 1x 6x 6x 6x 6x 6x 6x 6x 6x 6x 6x 6x 6x 1x 1x 9x 8x 8x 7x 7x 6x 1x 5x 5x 1x 4x 1x 3x 1x 2x 2x 2x 2x 1x 1x 9x 5x 5x 4x 4x 3x 1x 2x 2x 1x 1x 1x 1x 1x 1x 9x | /**
* User routes — identity-based profile CRUD, sign-in, provider linking.
*
* POST /api/users → Create new user (identity + uniqueId)
* POST /api/users/sign-in → Resolve identity, update firebaseUid
* GET /api/users/:uniqueId → Get user profile
* PATCH /api/users/:uniqueId → Update user profile fields
* POST /api/users/:uniqueId/link-provider → Link additional provider
* DELETE /api/users/:uniqueId/link-provider → Soft-remove (unlink) provider
* POST /api/users/:uniqueId/appeal → Submit suspension appeal
* POST /api/users/:uniqueId/lift-suspension→ Lift expired suspension
* POST /api/users/:uniqueId/follow → Follow a user
* POST /api/users/:uniqueId/unfollow → Unfollow a user
* POST /api/users/:uniqueId/remove-follower→ Remove a follower
* POST /api/users/:uniqueId/record-visit → Record profile visit (stalker)
* POST /api/users/:uniqueId/delete → Schedule account deletion (owner)
* POST /api/users/:uniqueId/cancel-delete → Cancel scheduled deletion (owner)
* GET /api/users/:uniqueId/deletion-status → Check deletion status (owner)
*/
const router = require('express').Router();
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const { db, auth, FieldValue } = require('../utils/firebase');
const { generateId, now } = require('../utils/helpers');
const { getDoc } = require('../utils/firestore-helpers');
const log = require('../utils/log');
const { clearSuspensionCache, updateUniqueIdCache } = require('../middleware/auth');
const { sendEmail } = require('../utils/email');
const { buildDeletionScheduledEmail } = require('../utils/email-templates');
const { sendFcmToTokens } = require('../utils/fcm');
const { viewerIsBlocked } = require('../utils/block-check');
const {
mintClaimsMerging,
deriveCohortFromUser,
cohortFromClaim,
effectiveCohort,
} = require('../utils/firebase-claims');
const { requireSameCohort } = require('../middleware/sameCohort');
const VALID_PROVIDERS = ['google', 'apple', 'email'];
const MIN_UNIQUE_ID = 10000000;
const MAX_IDENTIFIERS_PER_PROVIDER = 5;
// UK OSA #17 PR 5 — Discovery + search: shared limits and field hygiene.
const DISCOVERY_LIMIT = 50;
// 3-char minimum on Express defence-in-depth path: combined with the
// 30/min writeLimiter this raises brute-force prefix enumeration from
// ~22 min (bigram, 676 prefixes) to ~9.4 hr (trigram, 17,576 prefixes)
// at the rate cap. PR 5 security-review MEDIUM. Existing iOS client
// queries Firestore directly (gated by PR 3 rules), so the API-level
// min-char does not alter end-user typeahead UX.
const SEARCH_MIN_QUERY_CHARS = 3;
const SEARCH_MAX_QUERY_CHARS = 50;
// Highest BMP code point — canonical Firestore prefix-range upper bound.
const PREFIX_UPPER_SENTINEL = '\uf8ff';
/**
* Strip fields that must never leave the server. Applied uniformly to
* every user payload returned from this router so the discovery, search,
* and profile-view endpoints share a single source of truth and cannot
* drift apart.
*
* `cohort` and `cohortOverride` are stripped on top of the original
* sensitive set: a caller's same-cohort gate already implies they know
* their own bucket, and exposing `cohortOverride` would surface a
* moderator-action side channel (PR 5 security-review MEDIUM).
*
* Mutates and returns the input for compactness inside `.map` chains.
*/
function stripSensitiveFields(user) {
Iif (!user || typeof user !== 'object') return user;
delete user.gcsScore;
delete user.gcsLastDeductionAt;
delete user.gcsDisplayScore;
delete user.warningCount;
delete user.warningIssuedAt;
delete user.hasNewWarning;
delete user.pinHash;
delete user.fcmTokens;
delete user.firebaseUid;
delete user.email;
delete user.dateOfBirth;
delete user.deletionScheduledAt;
delete user.deletionReason;
delete user.deletionExecuteAt;
delete user.cohort;
delete user.cohortOverride;
if (Array.isArray(user.providers)) {
user.providers = user.providers.map(({ identifier: _identifier, ...rest }) => rest);
}
return user;
}
/**
* List-helpers: shape the per-doc shared filtering used by both
* `/users/discover` and the `/users/search` displayName branch. Returns
* `null` when the doc should be dropped (self, cross-effective-cohort,
* blocked-by-target). Otherwise returns the strip-sanitised doc.
*
* Defence layers in order:
* 1. Self-exclude — caller never appears in their own results.
* 2. effectiveCohort gate — guards against `cohort` field drift vs
* `cohortOverride`. The Firestore `where('cohort', '==', x)`
* narrowed the candidate set; this is the correctness backstop
* against the cache-field semantics documented in firebase-claims.js.
* 3. viewerIsBlocked — preserves the C7 block-list-integrity invariant
* that `GET /users/:uniqueId` enforces; the new list endpoints
* MUST NOT bypass it (PR 5 security-review HIGH).
*/
function shapeForViewer(callerUniqueId, callerCohort, data) {
Iif (!data) return null;
if (data.uniqueId === callerUniqueId) return null;
if (effectiveCohort(data) !== callerCohort) return null;
if (viewerIsBlocked(callerUniqueId, data)) return null;
return stripSensitiveFields(data);
}
/**
* Run a same-cohort list query and respond with the shaped + filtered
* results. Single source of truth for both `/users/discover` and the
* `/users/search` displayName branch — eliminates the result-aggregation
* duplication those routes would otherwise share.
*
* `queryBuilder` receives the users collection ref and the caller's
* resolved cohort, returns a Firestore query (without `.limit()` — the
* helper applies `DISCOVERY_LIMIT` consistently).
*/
async function respondWithSameCohortUsers(req, res, queryBuilder) {
const callerCohort = cohortFromClaim(req);
const snap = await queryBuilder(db.collection('users'), callerCohort)
.limit(DISCOVERY_LIMIT)
.get();
const users = [];
for (const doc of snap.docs) {
const shaped = shapeForViewer(req.auth.uniqueId, callerCohort, doc.data());
if (shaped) users.push(shaped);
}
res.json({ users });
}
/**
* Search disambiguator. A query is treated as a uniqueId lookup only
* when it is a positive integer ≥ MIN_UNIQUE_ID. Anything else falls
* through to the displayName-prefix branch — so e.g. "100" or "abc123"
* never short-circuits the cohort-filtered name search.
*/
function looksLikeUniqueId(q) {
if (!/^[1-9]\d*$/.test(q)) return false;
const n = Number(q);
return Number.isSafeInteger(n) && n >= MIN_UNIQUE_ID;
}
// ─── Helper: ownership check ────────────────────────────────────
function requireOwner(req, res) {
// Audit L1 (Phase 2A): explicit NaN guard. Without this, a non-
// numeric :uniqueId param produces NaN from Number(), and the
// comparison `req.auth.uniqueId !== NaN` is always true (NaN
// is unequal to everything including itself), so the route fails
// closed (403) — safe but obscure. Returning a clearer 400 makes
// a malformed-route-param the visible failure mode rather than
// a misleading 'Cannot modify another user'.
const paramId = Number(req.params.uniqueId);
if (!Number.isInteger(paramId)) {
res.status(400).json({ error: 'uniqueId must be a positive integer' });
return true; // blocked
}
if (req.auth.uniqueId !== paramId) {
res.status(403).json({ error: 'Cannot modify another user' });
return true; // blocked
}
return false;
}
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// POST /api/users — Create new user with identity map
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
router.post('/users', async (req, res) => {
try {
const { provider, identifier, displayName, email, profilePhotoUrl, dateOfBirth, language } =
req.body || {};
if (!provider) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'provider required' });
if (!identifier) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'identifier required' });
if (!VALID_PROVIDERS.includes(provider)) {
return res
.status(400)
.json({ error: `Invalid provider. Must be one of: ${VALID_PROVIDERS.join(', ')}` });
}
// Server-side age validation. Floor bumped 13 → 16 on 2026-05-03 for
// Apple App Store content-guideline compliance — see
// `.project/plans/2026-05-03-age-verification.md`. The 16-17 cohort
// signs up but cannot use 18+ gated features (private messages,
// gacha) until they age in or complete ID verification.
if (!dateOfBirth) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Date of birth is required' });
}
const dob = new Date(dateOfBirth);
if (Number.isNaN(dob.getTime())) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid date of birth format' });
}
// Calendar-year age computation. Pre-fix used (Date.now() - dob)
// / year-in-ms which produces wrong values around leap years
// (Feb 29 birthdays return 15.99... years for ~5 days after the
// 16th birthday) AND can be off-by-one near year boundaries due
// to UTC offset handling. Audit H1 (Phase 2A): regulatory issue
// (COPPA, GDPR, Apple age gate require accurate age).
//
// Correct algorithm: yearDiff, then subtract 1 if today's
// month/day is BEFORE the birth month/day (haven't had this
// year's birthday yet).
const today = new Date();
let age = today.getUTCFullYear() - dob.getUTCFullYear();
const monthDiff = today.getUTCMonth() - dob.getUTCMonth();
const dayDiff = today.getUTCDate() - dob.getUTCDate();
if (monthDiff < 0 || (monthDiff === 0 && dayDiff < 0)) {
age -= 1;
}
// Minimum sign-up age bumped 13 → 16 on 2026-05-03 for Apple App
// Store content-guideline compliance — see
// `.project/plans/2026-05-03-age-verification.md`. The 16-17 cohort
// can still create accounts but cannot use 18+ gated features
// (private messages, gacha) until they age into them OR complete
// ID-based age verification (handled in later PRs of this plan).
if (age < 16) {
log.warn('users', 'Age validation rejected', { dateOfBirth });
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Must be at least 16 years old' });
}
const identityDocId = `${provider}:${identifier}`;
const counterRef = db.doc('counters/uniqueId');
const identityRef = db.doc(`identityMap/${identityDocId}`);
const newUniqueId = await db.runTransaction(async (t) => {
// All reads first (Firestore transaction requirement)
const counterSnap = await t.get(counterRef);
const identitySnap = await t.get(identityRef);
// Check identity not already claimed
if (identitySnap.exists) {
const identityData = identitySnap.data();
if (identityData.unlinked) {
// Deleted accounts: allow clean re-registration, block suspended
Iif (identityData.deletedAccount && identityData.deletionStanding === 'clean') {
// Clean deletion — allow re-registration with new uniqueId
// The old identity map entry will be replaced below
} else {
throw Object.assign(new Error('Identity deactivated'), { code: 'DEACTIVATED' });
}
} else {
throw Object.assign(new Error('Identity already linked'), { code: 'ALREADY_LINKED' });
}
}
// Atomic counter increment
let current = counterSnap.exists ? counterSnap.data().value || 0 : 0;
if (current < MIN_UNIQUE_ID) current = MIN_UNIQUE_ID - 1;
const next = current + 1;
const timestamp = now();
// Write counter
t.set(counterRef, { value: next }, { merge: true });
// Write user doc
t.set(db.doc(`users/${next}`), {
uniqueId: next,
firebaseUid: req.auth.uid,
displayName: displayName || null,
email: email || null,
profilePhotoUrl: profilePhotoUrl || null,
dateOfBirth: dateOfBirth || null,
providers: [{ type: provider, identifier, active: true, linkedAt: timestamp }],
userType: 'MEMBER',
blockedUserIds: [],
followingIds: [],
followerIds: [],
fcmTokens: [],
aliases: {},
language: language || 'en',
stalkerCount: 0,
newStalkerCount: 0,
// Age verification (Apple App Store 18+ enforcement on PMs +
// gacha). New users start unverified; admin approves a manual
// ID review to flip to verified. See age-verification PR plan.
ageVerified: false,
ageVerifiedAt: null,
ageVerificationMethod: null,
createdAt: timestamp,
lastSeenAt: timestamp,
});
// Write identity map entry
t.set(db.doc(`identityMap/${identityDocId}`), {
uniqueId: next,
provider,
identifier,
linkedAt: timestamp,
unlinked: false,
unlinkedAt: null,
});
return next;
});
// Set Firebase custom claims so Firestore security rules can use
// callerUniqueId() AND the UK OSA #17 cohort gate. `age` was
// computed above from the validated DOB — cohort follows the
// same `>=18y` predicate as pmLocked. `skipFetch: true` because
// signup creates a brand-new Firebase Auth record with no
// existing claims; the getUser round-trip would be wasted work
// on the signup critical path.
const signupCohort = age >= 18 ? 'adult' : 'minor';
await mintClaimsMerging(
req.auth.uid,
{ uniqueId: newUniqueId, cohort: signupCohort },
{ skipFetch: true },
);
// Update uid → uniqueId cache so subsequent requests resolve instantly
updateUniqueIdCache(req.auth.uid, newUniqueId);
log.info('users', 'New user created', { uniqueId: newUniqueId, provider });
res.json({ success: true, created: true, uniqueId: newUniqueId });
} catch (err) {
if (err.code === 'ALREADY_LINKED') {
return res.status(409).json({ error: 'Identity already linked to an account' });
}
if (err.code === 'DEACTIVATED') {
return res
.status(409)
.json({ error: 'This identity has been deactivated. Contact support for assistance.' });
}
log.error('users', 'POST /users failed', { error: err.message });
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
}
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// POST /api/users/sign-in — Identity resolution + firebaseUid update
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
router.post('/users/sign-in', async (req, res) => {
try {
const { provider, identifier } = req.body || {};
if (!provider) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'provider required' });
if (!identifier) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'identifier required' });
const identityDocId = `${provider}:${identifier}`;
const identity = await getDoc(`identityMap/${identityDocId}`);
if (!identity) {
return res.json({ found: false });
}
if (identity.unlinked) {
return res.json({ found: false, deactivated: true });
}
const uniqueId = identity.uniqueId;
// Suspension check BEFORE updating firebaseUid + custom claims.
// Audit M5 (Phase 2A): pre-fix signed in suspended users (updated
// their UID and granted custom claims) before the auth-middleware
// suspension check ran. The suspension cache had a 5-min TTL —
// brief window where suspended users could perform writes.
//
// Now: read the user doc, check isSuspended, return found+suspended
// WITHOUT mutating Firebase state. Client surfaces the suspension
// to the user; no UID refresh, no custom claim grant.
const userSnap = await db.doc(`users/${uniqueId}`).get();
let userData = null;
if (userSnap.exists) {
userData = userSnap.data();
const isSuspended = userData.isSuspended ?? userData.is_suspended ?? false;
if (isSuspended) {
log.warn('users', 'Sign-in attempt by suspended user', { uniqueId, provider });
return res.json({
found: true,
suspended: true,
uniqueId,
});
}
}
// Update firebaseUid to current project's UID + refresh lastSeenAt
await db.doc(`users/${uniqueId}`).update({
firebaseUid: req.auth.uid,
lastSeenAt: now(),
});
// Mint custom claims (UK OSA #17 PR 2). Goes through the merge
// helper because the user may already have other claims
// (`admin: true` for moderators) we must preserve. Cohort is
// resolved via `deriveCohortFromUser` (NOT `effectiveCohort`):
// we re-derive from `dateOfBirth` rather than trusting the
// cached `cohort` field. Defends against the narrow window
// where admin DOB-modified the user but pm-lock-check hasn't
// run yet — the cached field would lie. Override (allow-listed)
// still wins; falls back to `'minor'` for legacy/missing DOB.
await mintClaimsMerging(req.auth.uid, {
uniqueId,
cohort: deriveCohortFromUser(userData),
});
// Update caches
updateUniqueIdCache(req.auth.uid, uniqueId);
log.info('users', 'User signed in via identity', { uniqueId, provider });
res.json({ found: true, uniqueId });
} catch (err) {
log.error('users', 'POST /users/sign-in failed', { error: err.message });
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
}
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// GET /api/users/discover — Same-cohort discovery feed
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// UK OSA #17 PR 5. Registered BEFORE `/users/:uniqueId` so the literal
// "discover" path segment doesn't get captured as a uniqueId param.
// Filters at the Firestore query level via the `(cohort, lastSeenAt)`
// composite index so cross-cohort users are never serialised at all,
// even before the response-layer sanitisation runs.
router.get('/users/discover', async (req, res) => {
try {
await respondWithSameCohortUsers(req, res, (col, cohort) =>
col.where('cohort', '==', cohort).orderBy('lastSeenAt', 'desc'),
);
} catch (err) {
log.error('users', 'GET /users/discover failed', { error: err.message });
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
}
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// GET /api/users/search?q=... — Same-cohort search
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// Two branches, auto-routed by query shape:
// • numeric q ≥ MIN_UNIQUE_ID → exact uniqueId fetch + requireSameCohort.
// Cross-cohort returns the existence-hiding 404 + segregationEvents
// audit just like every other interaction endpoint (the PR 4
// contract is preserved end-to-end here).
// • everything else → displayName prefix range gated by
// `where('cohort','==',callerCohort)`. The cohort `where` clause
// is the same Firestore-query-level enforcement as discovery.
router.get('/users/search', async (req, res) => {
try {
const q = typeof req.query.q === 'string' ? req.query.q.trim() : '';
if (!q) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'q required' });
if (q.length < SEARCH_MIN_QUERY_CHARS) {
return res
.status(400)
.json({ error: `q must be at least ${SEARCH_MIN_QUERY_CHARS} characters` });
}
if (q.length > SEARCH_MAX_QUERY_CHARS) {
return res
.status(400)
.json({ error: `q must be at most ${SEARCH_MAX_QUERY_CHARS} characters` });
}
if (looksLikeUniqueId(q)) {
// Numeric branch: single-doc lookup + same-cohort gate.
// `requireSameCohort` writes the existence-hiding 404 + audit on
// miss too — so when `target` is null and `!isSelf`, the middleware
// already sent the 404 and we returned above. The `if (!target)`
// below is reachable only on the self-search-of-own-missing-id
// path (caller asks for their own uniqueId, doc somehow absent).
const target = await getDoc(`users/${q}`);
const isSelf = String(req.auth.uniqueId) === q;
if (!isSelf && (await requireSameCohort(req, res, q, () => target))) {
return;
}
Iif (!target) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Not found' });
// Block-list integrity: blocked viewer must not retrieve target
// profile (matches `GET /users/:uniqueId` semantics; self bypasses).
if (!isSelf && viewerIsBlocked(req.auth.uniqueId, target)) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Cannot view content of users who have blocked you' });
}
stripSensitiveFields(target);
return res.json({ users: [target] });
}
// displayName prefix branch.
await respondWithSameCohortUsers(req, res, (col, cohort) =>
col
.where('cohort', '==', cohort)
.where('displayName', '>=', q)
.where('displayName', '<', q + PREFIX_UPPER_SENTINEL),
);
} catch (err) {
log.error('users', 'GET /users/search failed', { error: err.message });
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
}
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// GET /api/users/:uniqueId — Get user profile
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
router.get('/users/:uniqueId', async (req, res) => {
try {
const user = await getDoc(`users/${req.params.uniqueId}`);
// UK OSA #17 PR 4 — cross-cohort profile views return 404 with
// existence-hiding body (`{ error: 'Not found' }`), byte-identical
// to the legitimate "missing target" 404. Self-view bypasses the
// gate (caller's own profile is always visible).
const isSelf = String(req.auth.uniqueId) === String(req.params.uniqueId);
if (!isSelf && (await requireSameCohort(req, res, req.params.uniqueId, () => user))) {
return;
}
Iif (!user) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Not found' });
// C7 (block-list integrity): the target user must not be visible
// to a viewer they have blocked. Returns 403 — the client already
// handles 403 from interaction endpoints (gift-send) the same way.
// Allowed exception: the user looking at their own profile.
if (!isSelf && viewerIsBlocked(req.auth.uniqueId, user)) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Cannot view content of users who have blocked you' });
}
user.blockedUserIds = user.blockedUserIds || [];
user.followingIds = user.followingIds || [];
user.followerIds = user.followerIds || [];
// Strip admin-only / PII / deletion / cohort fields. Single source of
// truth shared with /users/discover and /users/search.
stripSensitiveFields(user);
res.json(user);
} catch (err) {
log.error('users', 'GET /users/:uniqueId failed', {
uniqueId: req.params.uniqueId,
error: err.message,
});
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
}
});
// ─── Profile update validation ─────────────────────────────────
const PROFILE_STRING_FIELDS = [
'displayName',
'description',
'nationality',
'profilePhotoUrl',
'coverPhotoUrl',
'pmPrivacy',
'currentRoomId',
'lastRoomName',
'language',
];
const PROFILE_MAX_LENGTHS = {
displayName: 20,
description: 200,
nationality: 3,
language: 10,
lastRoomName: 50,
};
const PROFILE_BOOL_FIELDS = [
'pmNotificationsEnabled',
'pmSoundEnabled',
'pmShowTimestamps',
'pmShowDateSeparators',
'pmNotificationPreview',
'hideFollowing',
'hideOnlineStatus',
'hideAge',
'selfDestructAlertEnabled',
'dndEnabled',
];
const PROFILE_INT_FIELDS = [
'dndStartHour',
'dndStartMinute',
'dndEndHour',
'dndEndMinute',
'minGiftAnimationValue',
'acceptedLegalVersion',
];
/** Validate profile update field types and constraints. Returns error string or null. */
function validateProfileUpdates(updates) {
for (const key of PROFILE_STRING_FIELDS) {
Iif (key in updates && updates[key] !== null && typeof updates[key] !== 'string') {
return `${key} must be a string`;
}
Iif (
key in updates &&
typeof updates[key] === 'string' &&
PROFILE_MAX_LENGTHS[key] &&
updates[key].length > PROFILE_MAX_LENGTHS[key]
) {
return `${key} exceeds max length of ${PROFILE_MAX_LENGTHS[key]}`;
}
}
for (const key of PROFILE_BOOL_FIELDS) {
Iif (key in updates && typeof updates[key] !== 'boolean') return `${key} must be a boolean`;
}
for (const key of PROFILE_INT_FIELDS) {
Iif (key in updates && (typeof updates[key] !== 'number' || !Number.isInteger(updates[key])))
return `${key} must be an integer`;
}
for (const key of ['dndStartHour', 'dndEndHour']) {
Iif (key in updates && (updates[key] < 0 || updates[key] > 23))
return `${key} must be between 0 and 23`;
}
for (const key of ['dndStartMinute', 'dndEndMinute']) {
Iif (key in updates && (updates[key] < 0 || updates[key] > 59))
return `${key} must be between 0 and 59`;
}
return null;
}
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// PATCH /api/users/:uniqueId — Update user profile
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
router.patch('/users/:uniqueId', async (req, res) => {
try {
if (requireOwner(req, res)) return;
const body = req.body;
Iif (!body) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid JSON body' });
const allowedFields = [
'displayName',
'description',
'nationality',
'profilePhotoUrl',
'coverPhotoUrl',
'pmPrivacy',
'pmNotificationsEnabled',
'pmSoundEnabled',
'pmShowTimestamps',
'pmShowDateSeparators',
'pmNotificationPreview',
'hideFollowing',
'hideOnlineStatus',
'hideAge',
'selfDestructAlertEnabled',
'minGiftAnimationValue',
'dndEnabled',
'dndStartHour',
'dndStartMinute',
'dndEndHour',
'dndEndMinute',
'acceptedLegalVersion',
'currentRoomId',
'lastRoomName',
'language',
];
const updates = {};
for (const key of allowedFields) {
if (key in body) updates[key] = body[key];
}
if (Object.keys(updates).length === 0) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'No valid fields to update' });
}
// Validate field value types and lengths
const validationError = validateProfileUpdates(updates);
Iif (validationError) return res.status(400).json({ error: validationError });
// GDPR consent audit trail — store acceptance timestamp
Iif (updates.acceptedLegalVersion !== undefined) {
updates.legalAcceptedAt = Date.now();
}
log.info('users', 'Updating profile', {
uniqueId: req.params.uniqueId,
fields: Object.keys(updates),
});
await db.doc(`users/${req.params.uniqueId}`).update(updates);
res.json({ success: true });
} catch (err) {
log.error('users', 'PATCH /users/:uniqueId failed', {
uniqueId: req.params.uniqueId,
error: err.message,
});
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
}
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// POST /api/users/:uniqueId/link-provider — Link additional provider
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
router.post('/users/:uniqueId/link-provider', async (req, res) => {
try {
if (requireOwner(req, res)) return;
const { provider, identifier } = req.body || {};
if (!provider) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'provider required' });
if (!identifier) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'identifier required' });
Iif (!VALID_PROVIDERS.includes(provider)) {
return res
.status(400)
.json({ error: `Invalid provider. Must be one of: ${VALID_PROVIDERS.join(', ')}` });
}
const uniqueId = Number(req.params.uniqueId);
const identityDocId = `${provider}:${identifier}`;
// Load user doc + identity map entry in parallel
const [user, existingIdentity] = await Promise.all([
getDoc(`users/${uniqueId}`),
getDoc(`identityMap/${identityDocId}`),
]);
Iif (!user) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'User not found' });
// Check if identity is already claimed
if (existingIdentity && existingIdentity.uniqueId !== uniqueId) {
return res.status(409).json({ error: 'This identity is already linked to another account' });
}
if (existingIdentity && existingIdentity.unlinked) {
// Re-linking own deactivated identity
const timestamp = now();
await db
.doc(`identityMap/${identityDocId}`)
.update({ unlinked: false, unlinkedAt: null, linkedAt: timestamp });
const providers = (user.providers || []).map((p) =>
p.type === provider && p.identifier === identifier
? { ...p, active: true, linkedAt: timestamp, unlinkedAt: undefined }
: p,
);
await db.doc(`users/${uniqueId}`).update({ providers });
log.info('users', 'Provider re-linked', {
uniqueId,
provider,
identifier: identifier.includes('@') ? `***@${identifier.split('@')[1]}` : '***',
});
return res.json({ success: true, relinked: true });
}
Iif (existingIdentity) {
// Already active — no-op
return res.json({ success: true, alreadyLinked: true });
}
// Check provider count limit
const existingOfType = (user.providers || []).filter((p) => p.type === provider && p.active);
if (existingOfType.length >= MAX_IDENTIFIERS_PER_PROVIDER) {
return res
.status(409)
.json({ error: 'Unable to link this account. Please contact support for assistance.' });
}
const timestamp = now();
// Create identity map entry
await db.doc(`identityMap/${identityDocId}`).set({
uniqueId,
provider,
identifier,
linkedAt: timestamp,
unlinked: false,
unlinkedAt: null,
});
// Update providers array
const providers = [
...(user.providers || []),
{ type: provider, identifier, active: true, linkedAt: timestamp },
];
await db.doc(`users/${uniqueId}`).update({ providers });
log.info('users', 'Provider linked', {
uniqueId,
provider,
identifier: identifier.includes('@') ? `***@${identifier.split('@')[1]}` : '***',
});
res.json({ success: true });
} catch (err) {
log.error('users', 'Link provider failed', {
uniqueId: req.params.uniqueId,
error: err.message,
});
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
}
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// DELETE /api/users/:uniqueId/link-provider — Soft-remove provider
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
router.delete('/users/:uniqueId/link-provider', async (req, res) => {
try {
if (requireOwner(req, res)) return;
const { provider, identifier } = req.body || {};
Iif (!provider) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'provider required' });
Iif (!identifier) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'identifier required' });
const uniqueId = Number(req.params.uniqueId);
const identityDocId = `${provider}:${identifier}`;
// Load user doc + identity map entry
const [user, identity] = await Promise.all([
getDoc(`users/${uniqueId}`),
getDoc(`identityMap/${identityDocId}`),
]);
Iif (!user) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'User not found' });
if (!identity) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Identity not found' });
// Verify identity belongs to this user
if (identity.uniqueId !== uniqueId) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Identity does not belong to this user' });
}
// Check at least 2 active providers remain
const activeProviders = (user.providers || []).filter((p) => p.active);
if (activeProviders.length < 2) {
return res.status(400).json({
error: 'Cannot unlink your only active provider. At least one provider must remain linked.',
});
}
const timestamp = now();
// Soft-remove identity map entry
await db.doc(`identityMap/${identityDocId}`).update({
unlinked: true,
unlinkedAt: timestamp,
});
// Update providers array — set active=false + unlinkedAt
const providers = (user.providers || []).map((p) =>
p.type === provider && p.identifier === identifier
? { ...p, active: false, unlinkedAt: timestamp }
: p,
);
await db.doc(`users/${uniqueId}`).update({ providers });
log.info('users', 'Provider unlinked', {
uniqueId,
provider,
identifier: identifier.includes('@') ? `***@${identifier.split('@')[1]}` : '***',
});
res.json({ success: true });
} catch (err) {
log.error('users', 'Unlink provider failed', {
uniqueId: req.params.uniqueId,
error: err.message,
});
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
}
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// POST /api/users/:uniqueId/appeal — Suspension appeal
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
router.post('/users/:uniqueId/appeal', async (req, res) => {
try {
if (requireOwner(req, res)) return;
const body = req.body;
if (!body?.appealText) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'appealText required' });
if (typeof body.appealText !== 'string' || body.appealText.length > 500) {
return res
.status(400)
.json({ error: 'appealText must be a string of at most 500 characters' });
}
const uniqueId = req.params.uniqueId;
// Idempotency check: if a pending appeal already exists, reject
// with 409. Without this, a user could spam the endpoint, creating
// unbounded suspensionAppeals docs (Spark quota burn) and admin
// noise. Audit H2 (Phase 2A).
const userSnap = await db.doc(`users/${uniqueId}`).get();
Eif (userSnap.exists) {
const userData = userSnap.data();
const currentStatus = userData.suspensionAppealStatus;
if (currentStatus === 'pending') {
return res.status(409).json({ error: 'Appeal already pending' });
}
}
log.info('users', 'Suspension appeal submitted', { uniqueId });
await Promise.all([
db.doc(`suspensionAppeals/${generateId()}`).set(
{
uniqueId,
appealText: body.appealText,
status: 'pending',
createdAt: now(),
},
{ merge: true },
),
db.doc(`users/${uniqueId}`).update({
suspensionAppealStatus: 'pending',
}),
]);
res.json({ success: true });
} catch (err) {
log.error('users', 'Suspension appeal failed', {
uniqueId: req.params.uniqueId,
error: err.message,
});
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
}
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// POST /api/users/:uniqueId/lift-suspension — Lift expired suspension
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
router.post('/users/:uniqueId/lift-suspension', async (req, res) => {
try {
if (requireOwner(req, res)) return;
const uniqueId = req.params.uniqueId;
const user = await getDoc(`users/${uniqueId}`);
const isSuspended = user?.isSuspended ?? user?.is_suspended ?? false;
if (!user || !isSuspended) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'User is not suspended' });
}
const suspensionEndDate = user.suspensionEndDate ?? user.suspension_end_date ?? null;
if (suspensionEndDate && suspensionEndDate > now()) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Suspension has not expired yet' });
}
log.info('users', 'Lifting expired suspension', { uniqueId });
await db.doc(`users/${uniqueId}`).update({
isSuspended: false,
suspensionReason: null,
suspensionEndDate: null,
suspensionCanAppeal: true,
suspensionAppealStatus: null,
suspendedBy: null,
});
clearSuspensionCache(Number(uniqueId));
res.json({ success: true });
} catch (err) {
log.error('users', 'Lift suspension failed', {
uniqueId: req.params.uniqueId,
error: err.message,
});
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
}
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// POST /api/users/:uniqueId/follow — Follow a user
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
router.post('/users/:uniqueId/follow', async (req, res) => {
try {
const body = req.body;
const rawTargetId = body?.targetUserId;
Iif (!rawTargetId) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'targetUserId required' });
if (requireOwner(req, res)) return;
// Strict integer validation. Pre-fix used Number(targetId) which
// turns 'evil../path' into NaN and stuffs NaN into followingIds via
// arrayUnion(NaN). NaN poisoning corrupts every subsequent array
// operation against the field. Audit H3 (Phase 2A).
const targetId = Number.parseInt(String(rawTargetId), 10);
if (!Number.isInteger(targetId) || targetId <= 0) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'targetUserId must be a positive integer' });
}
if (String(targetId) !== String(rawTargetId).trim()) {
// Reject inputs like '123abc' that parseInt would silently
// truncate to 123 — strict round-trip equality.
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'targetUserId must be a positive integer' });
}
const uniqueId = Number(req.params.uniqueId);
Iif (uniqueId === targetId) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Cannot follow yourself' });
}
// Verify target user exists + UK OSA #17 PR 4 cross-cohort gate.
// requireSameCohort returns 404 with `{ error: 'Not found' }` for
// both missing-target AND cross-cohort cases (existence-hiding).
const targetSnap = await db.doc(`users/${targetId}`).get();
if (
await requireSameCohort(req, res, targetId, () =>
targetSnap.exists ? targetSnap.data() : null,
)
) {
return;
}
const batch = db.batch();
batch.update(db.doc(`users/${uniqueId}`), {
followingIds: FieldValue.arrayUnion(targetId),
});
batch.update(db.doc(`users/${targetId}`), {
followerIds: FieldValue.arrayUnion(uniqueId),
});
await batch.commit();
log.info('users', 'User followed', { uniqueId, targetUserId: targetId });
res.json({ success: true });
} catch (err) {
log.error('users', 'Follow failed', {
uniqueId: req.params.uniqueId,
targetUserId: req.body?.targetUserId,
error: err.message,
});
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to follow user' });
}
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// POST /api/users/:uniqueId/unfollow — Unfollow a user
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
router.post('/users/:uniqueId/unfollow', async (req, res) => {
try {
const body = req.body;
const rawTargetId = body?.targetUserId;
if (!rawTargetId) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'targetUserId required' });
if (requireOwner(req, res)) return;
// Strict integer validation (mirrors follow handler — Phase 2A
// audit H3). `Number.parseInt('123abc', 10) === 123` silently
// truncates, then arrayRemove(123) poisons followingIds.
const targetId = Number.parseInt(String(rawTargetId), 10);
Iif (!Number.isInteger(targetId) || targetId <= 0) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'targetUserId must be a positive integer' });
}
if (String(targetId) !== String(rawTargetId).trim()) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'targetUserId must be a positive integer' });
}
// UK OSA #17 PR 4 — cross-cohort unfollow returns 404 (existence-hiding).
// Even though PR 6 migration revokes cross-cohort follows server-side,
// a stale client retry must not leak existence of the cross-cohort user.
if (
await requireSameCohort(req, res, targetId, async () => {
const snap = await db.doc(`users/${Number(targetId)}`).get();
return snap.exists ? snap.data() : null;
})
) {
return;
}
const uniqueId = req.params.uniqueId;
const batch = db.batch();
batch.update(db.doc(`users/${uniqueId}`), {
followingIds: FieldValue.arrayRemove(Number(targetId)),
});
batch.update(db.doc(`users/${targetId}`), {
followerIds: FieldValue.arrayRemove(Number(uniqueId)),
});
await batch.commit();
log.info('users', 'User unfollowed', { uniqueId, targetUserId: targetId });
res.json({ success: true });
} catch (err) {
log.error('users', 'Unfollow failed', {
uniqueId: req.params.uniqueId,
targetUserId: req.body?.targetUserId,
error: err.message,
});
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to unfollow user' });
}
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// POST /api/users/:uniqueId/remove-follower — Remove a follower
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
router.post('/users/:uniqueId/remove-follower', async (req, res) => {
try {
const body = req.body;
const rawFollowerId = body?.followerUserId;
if (!rawFollowerId) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'followerUserId required' });
if (requireOwner(req, res)) return;
// Strict integer validation — same NaN-poisoning defence as follow.
const followerId = Number.parseInt(String(rawFollowerId), 10);
Iif (!Number.isInteger(followerId) || followerId <= 0) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'followerUserId must be a positive integer' });
}
if (String(followerId) !== String(rawFollowerId).trim()) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'followerUserId must be a positive integer' });
}
// UK OSA #17 PR 4 — cross-cohort remove-follower returns 404
// (existence-hiding); mirrors unfollow.
if (
await requireSameCohort(req, res, followerId, async () => {
const snap = await db.doc(`users/${Number(followerId)}`).get();
return snap.exists ? snap.data() : null;
})
) {
return;
}
const uniqueId = req.params.uniqueId;
const batch = db.batch();
batch.update(db.doc(`users/${uniqueId}`), {
followerIds: FieldValue.arrayRemove(Number(followerId)),
});
batch.update(db.doc(`users/${followerId}`), {
followingIds: FieldValue.arrayRemove(Number(uniqueId)),
});
await batch.commit();
log.info('users', 'Follower removed', { uniqueId, followerUserId: followerId });
res.json({ success: true });
} catch (err) {
log.error('users', 'Remove follower failed', {
uniqueId: req.params.uniqueId,
followerUserId: req.body?.followerUserId,
error: err.message,
});
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to remove follower' });
}
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// POST /api/users/:uniqueId/record-visit — Record profile visit
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
router.post('/users/:uniqueId/record-visit', async (req, res) => {
try {
const body = req.body;
const visitorId = body?.visitorId;
if (!visitorId) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'visitorId required' });
// visitorId must match caller's uniqueId (string comparison since param is string)
if (String(req.auth.uniqueId) !== String(visitorId)) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Forbidden' });
}
if (req.params.uniqueId === visitorId) return res.json({ success: true }); // don't stalk yourself
const profileUniqueId = req.params.uniqueId;
// C7: blocked viewers must not tick the stalker counter on the
// target's profile (otherwise blocking is observably useless —
// the blocker keeps getting "X new visitors" notifications driven
// by a user they've already chosen to disengage from). Return 200
// with success:true so the client treats the call as completed,
// avoiding a retry loop or a UI signal that reveals block state.
const targetUser = await getDoc(`users/${profileUniqueId}`);
// UK OSA #17 PR 4 cross-cohort gate. Same guard-pattern as
// requireOwner / requireAdmin: returns true when it has already
// sent the response (404 existence-hiding), so caller returns.
const blocked = await requireSameCohort(req, res, profileUniqueId, () => targetUser);
if (blocked) return;
if (viewerIsBlocked(visitorId, targetUser)) {
return res.json({ success: true, recorded: false });
}
const stalkerPath = `users/${profileUniqueId}/stalkers/${visitorId}`;
const existing = await getDoc(stalkerPath);
const timestamp = now();
if (existing) {
const batch = db.batch();
batch.update(db.doc(stalkerPath), {
lastVisitedAt: timestamp,
visitCount: (existing.visitCount || 1) + 1,
});
batch.update(db.doc(`users/${profileUniqueId}`), {
newStalkerCount: FieldValue.increment(1),
});
await batch.commit();
} else {
const batch = db.batch();
batch.set(
db.doc(stalkerPath),
{
visitorId,
lastVisitedAt: timestamp,
firstVisitedAt: timestamp,
visitCount: 1,
},
{ merge: true },
);
batch.update(db.doc(`users/${profileUniqueId}`), {
stalkerCount: FieldValue.increment(1),
newStalkerCount: FieldValue.increment(1),
});
await batch.commit();
}
res.json({ success: true });
} catch (err) {
log.error('users', 'Record visit failed', {
profileUniqueId: req.params.uniqueId,
visitorId: req.body?.visitorId,
error: err.message,
});
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
}
});
/** Send email and push notification for scheduled account deletion. */
async function sendDeletionNotifications(user, executeAt) {
const deleteDate = new Date(executeAt).toISOString().split('T')[0];
if (user.email) {
try {
const template = buildDeletionScheduledEmail(deleteDate);
await sendEmail(user.email, template.subject, template.html);
} catch (emailErr) {
log.error('users', 'Failed to send deletion email', { error: emailErr.message });
}
}
if (user.fcmTokens && user.fcmTokens.length > 0) {
try {
await sendFcmToTokens(user.fcmTokens, {
notification: {
title: 'Account Deletion Scheduled',
body: `Your account will be deleted on ${deleteDate}. Sign in to cancel.`,
},
});
} catch (fcmErr) {
log.error('users', 'Failed to send deletion push', { error: fcmErr.message });
}
}
}
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// POST /api/users/:uniqueId/delete — Schedule account deletion
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
router.post('/users/:uniqueId/delete', async (req, res) => {
try {
if (requireOwner(req, res)) return;
const uniqueId = req.params.uniqueId;
const { pin } = req.body || {};
// Fetch user
const userSnap = await db.doc(`users/${uniqueId}`).get();
if (!userSnap.exists) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'User not found' });
}
const user = userSnap.data();
// Check if already scheduled
if (user.deletionScheduledAt) {
return res.status(409).json({ error: 'Deletion already scheduled' });
}
// Verify identity: PIN required
if (!pin) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'PIN verification required' });
}
// Length-validate PIN BEFORE bcrypt.compare. Without this, a
// 1MB-string PIN (allowed by express.json limit) would block the
// Node event loop for hundreds of ms — single-request DoS. Audit
// H4 (Phase 2A). PINs are app-side 4-digit codes; allowing 4-16
// chars covers any future format expansion (alphanumeric backup
// codes, etc.) without exposing the bcrypt-DoS surface.
if (typeof pin !== 'string' || pin.length < 4 || pin.length > 16) {
log.warn('users', 'PIN length validation rejected', {
uniqueId,
pinType: typeof pin,
pinLength: typeof pin === 'string' ? pin.length : null,
});
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'PIN must be a string of 4-16 characters' });
}
if (!user.pinHash) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'No PIN set for this account' });
}
const isValid = await bcrypt.compare(pin, user.pinHash);
if (!isValid) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Wrong PIN' });
}
// Get grace period from config
const configSnap = await db.doc('config/app').get();
const graceDays = configSnap.exists
? configSnap.data().accountDeletionGracePeriodDays || 30
: 30;
const timestamp = now();
const executeAt = timestamp + graceDays * 86400000;
// Set deletion fields + clear room
const updates = {
deletionScheduledAt: timestamp,
deletionReason: 'self',
deletionExecuteAt: executeAt,
currentRoomId: null,
};
await db.doc(`users/${uniqueId}`).update(updates);
// Revoke refresh tokens (sign out all devices)
try {
await auth.revokeRefreshTokens(user.firebaseUid);
} catch (revokeErr) {
log.error('users', 'Failed to revoke refresh tokens', { error: revokeErr.message });
}
// Send deletion notifications (best-effort)
await sendDeletionNotifications(user, executeAt);
// Audit log
await db.doc(`adminAuditLog/${generateId()}`).set({
action: 'ACCOUNT_DELETION_SCHEDULED',
targetUserId: uniqueId,
triggeredBy: 'self',
reason: 'self',
createdAt: timestamp,
});
log.info('users', 'Account deletion scheduled', { uniqueId, executeAt });
res.json({ success: true, deleteAt: executeAt });
} catch (err) {
log.error('users', 'Failed to schedule account deletion', { error: err.message });
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
}
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// POST /api/users/:uniqueId/cancel-delete — Cancel scheduled deletion
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
router.post('/users/:uniqueId/cancel-delete', async (req, res) => {
try {
if (requireOwner(req, res)) return;
const uniqueId = req.params.uniqueId;
const userSnap = await db.doc(`users/${uniqueId}`).get();
if (!userSnap.exists) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'User not found' });
}
const user = userSnap.data();
if (!user.deletionScheduledAt) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'No deletion scheduled' });
}
// Admin-initiated deletions cannot be cancelled by the user
if (user.deletionReason === 'admin') {
return res
.status(403)
.json({ error: 'Admin-initiated deletion cannot be cancelled by the user' });
}
// Check if deletion already executed
if (user.deletionExecuteAt && user.deletionExecuteAt <= now()) {
return res.status(410).json({ error: 'Deletion has already been executed' });
}
await db.doc(`users/${uniqueId}`).update({
deletionScheduledAt: null,
deletionReason: null,
deletionExecuteAt: null,
});
// Audit log
await db.doc(`adminAuditLog/${generateId()}`).set({
action: 'ACCOUNT_DELETION_CANCELLED',
targetUserId: uniqueId,
triggeredBy: 'self',
createdAt: now(),
});
log.info('users', 'Account deletion cancelled', { uniqueId });
res.json({ success: true });
} catch (err) {
log.error('users', 'Failed to cancel account deletion', { error: err.message });
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
}
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// GET /api/users/:uniqueId/deletion-status — Check deletion status
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
router.get('/users/:uniqueId/deletion-status', async (req, res) => {
try {
if (requireOwner(req, res)) return;
const uniqueId = req.params.uniqueId;
const userSnap = await db.doc(`users/${uniqueId}`).get();
if (!userSnap.exists) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'User not found' });
}
const user = userSnap.data();
if (!user.deletionScheduledAt) {
return res.json({
scheduled: false,
scheduledAt: null,
executeAt: null,
reason: null,
daysRemaining: null,
});
}
const msRemaining = user.deletionExecuteAt - now();
const daysRemaining = Math.max(0, Math.ceil(msRemaining / 86400000));
res.json({
scheduled: true,
scheduledAt: user.deletionScheduledAt,
executeAt: user.deletionExecuteAt,
reason: user.deletionReason,
daysRemaining,
});
} catch (err) {
log.error('users', 'Failed to get deletion status', { error: err.message });
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
}
});
module.exports = router;
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